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ABSTRACT 
This thesis will demonstrate that women and women’s groups in the 
Muslim world could be a strong ally in reducing the influence and spread of 
Islamist ideologies.  Women and women’s organizations have proven that they 
are effective in resisting the impact of Islamism and have been able to role back 
some of its repressive policies as evidenced by the case studies of Iran, Algeria, 
and Afghanistan.  Women and women’s organizations or feminist groups are 
currently active in the Muslim world already and are a growing voice in the 
region.  Therefore, it is of vital interest to the United States Government to 
engage these groups and women’s interests as a means of challenging the 
spread of Islamist ideology and enlisting them in the war of ideas. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This thesis will examine Muslim women and women’s groups to determine 
whether they could be a critical vulnerability in Islamist ideology and an asset to 
the United States in the Global War on Terror.    
President Bush stated, while speaking at the fifth anniversary of 
September 11, "In the long term, we've got to defeat an ideology of hate with an 
ideology of hope."1  Senator Joe Lieberman, chairman of the Senate Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, said that a war of ideas is needed 
to counter Islamic extremists.  "Because this is a war, but it is ultimately a war 
against, and with, an ideology that is inimical to our own values of freedom and 
tolerance and diversity.”  In addition, the State Department lists three main 
elements of its strategy as:  
[1]Offer people throughout the world a positive vision of hope and 
opportunity that is rooted in America’s belief in freedom, justice, 
opportunity and respect for all; Isolate and marginalize the violent 
extremists; confront their ideology of tyranny and hate.  [2] 
Undermine their efforts to portray the west as in conflict with Islam 
by empowering mainstream voices and demonstrating respect for 
Muslim cultures and contributions; [3] Foster a sense of common 
interests and common values between Americans and people of 
different countries, cultures and faiths throughout the world.2 
One often overlooked element that could be a part of this strategy, and an 
ally in the war of ideas, is women and women’s organizations in the Muslim 
world.  “The militant Islamist movements, which have proliferated across a wide 
variety of cultures and societies in North Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast 
Asia, have propagated remarkably similar policies and doctrines with regard to 
                                            
1 Fox News, Fox News Online, “Bush Visits 9/11 Sites to Mark 5-Year Anniversary,” 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,213330,00.html?sPage=fnc.national/_911, accessed 16 
October 2007. 
2 Michael J. Waller, Fighting the War of Ideas Like a Real War (Washington: The Institute of 
World Politics Press, 2007), 16. 
 2
gender issues.”3  Islamist groups have attempted, and to differing degrees have 
succeeded, in imposing their view of Islam.  Iran, Egypt, Algeria, Sudan, and 
Afghanistan are just some of the more prominent examples in which Islamists 
gained a large following that subsequently resulted in widespread violence, with 
women bearing the brunt of that violence.  Women in the Muslim world are the 
most affected by Islamist ideology, and it is this shared understanding of the 
threat that Islamism poses.  This is the result of the symbolic nature of women in 
Muslim societies and the importance that Islamists place on separating 
themselves from those they view as evil.  Women have come to dominate 
Islamists policies because the image of the veiled Muslim women is a powerful 
symbol of their faith.  In countries in which the Islamists gained influence, women 
lost rights, such as the right to work outside the home, and the loss of legal 
recourse, especially in matters of family law.  Additionally, women have born the 
brunt of violence, as demonstrated in Iran, Algeria, and Afghanistan, with the 
floggings and arrests of thousands of women for not being modestly dressed.  
These issues could be the basis for cooperation between the United States and 
women’s groups in the Muslim world to counter and resist the spread if Islamism.   
This thesis will demonstrate that women and women’s groups in the 
Muslim world could be a strong ally in reducing the influence and spread of 
Islamist ideologies.  Women and women’s organizations are active in the Muslim 
world already and are a growing voice in the region.  It is of vital interest to the 
United States to engage these groups and women’s interests as a means of 
resisting the domination and continued spread of Islamist ideology.  Engagement 
options include working with these groups, but more probable — due to the 
current poor perception of the U.S. in the Muslim world — the U.S. should work 
indirectly through other organizations and programs to reach out to Muslim 
women. The U.S. must open an active dialogue with these women and 
organizations to listen to their issues and build a shared understanding of the 
                                            
3 Janet Afary, “The War Against Feminism in the Name of the Almighty: Making Sense of 
Gender and Muslim Fundamentalism,” (Women Living Under Muslim Laws, Dossier 21, 
September 1998), 1. 
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threat that Islamism brings.  In addition, the U.S. can use its diplomatic, 
informational, and economic assets, and considerable influence to have an 
impact at the root level of Islamism. 
Drawing on social movement theory, this thesis begins by constructing an 
analytical framework for investigating Islamist and feminist movements in the 
Muslim world.  The thesis then examines three case studies, Iran, Algeria, and 
Afghanistan, to determine the conditions under which women’s movements 
began, how they resourced themselves, and how they framed their arguments 
against Islamism.   
The “women question” of Islam and the accompanying discourse of 
feminism in response to Islamist ideology has great potential for the United 
States as a means of working towards a better understanding of our mutual 
interests, and for resisting the influence and spread of Islamist ideology.   
This thesis finds that women and women’s groups in the Muslim world 
could be a strong ally in reducing the influence and spread of Islamist ideologies.  
Women and women’s organizations have proven that they are effective in 
resisting the impact of Islamism and have been able to reverse some of its 
repressive policies.  Women and women’s organizations or feminist groups are 
already active in the Muslim world and are a growing voice in the region; based 
on this point of agreement, and work that is already being done, the U.S. can 

















II.  ISLAMISM 
A. FUNDAMENTALISM AND WOMEN 
The “women question” has once again come to the forefront as a major 
issue in determining the course of Islam in today’s world.  This is nothing new to 
the Muslim world as “the ‘women question’ presents the most consistent point of 
contention between traditional and modern society, and one that continually 
emerges despite attempts to avoid or shelve the issue.  Both Islamists, and Arab 
nationalists more specifically, have engaged the issue of women’s role and 
status throughout their history.”4  One scholar notes, “One of the most striking 
features of Islamist movements throughout the Arab world is their preoccupation 
with the ‘women question.’”  The rights of women and the roles they play are 
central to the Islamists’ agenda.5  Today, the “women question” is at the crux of 
the conflict between the Islamists and the greater public sphere of the Muslim 
world. 
This chapter will examine and discuss fundamentalism, Islamic 
fundamentalism, Islamism, and leading Islamist thinkers’ ideologies.  Specifically, 
this chapter will look at each of these with respect to their ideas about women.  
Fundamentalism, Islamic fundamentalism, and Islamism are all important 
ideologies that are at the heart of the war of ideas.  It is this fundamental ideology 
that the United States should recognize and seek to counter by working 
independently, as well as working with and through women, and women’s 
organizations that are currently at risk or fighting Islamism.  
                                            
4 Michelle Browers, “The Centrality and Marginalization of Women in the Political Discourse 
of Arab Nationalists and Islamist,” Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2, Spring, 
(2006): 10. 
5 Lisa Taraki, “Islam is the Solution: Jordanian Islamists and the Dilemma of the Modern 
Woman,” British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 46, No. 4 (1995): 643. 
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1. Fundamentalism 
Fundamentalism was initially used to describe  
a movement in American Protestantism that arose in the early part 
of the 20th century in reaction to modernism and that stresses the 
infallibility of the Bible not only in matters of faith and morals but 
also as a literal historical record, holding as essential to Christian 
faith belief in such doctrines as the creation of the world, the virgin 
birth, physical resurrection, atonement by the sacrificial death of 
Christ, and the Second Coming.6   
This term has taken on new meaning with regard to Islam, specifically in 
reference to the current radical Islamic movements that got their start with the 
Arab nationalists’ defeat during the Six Day War with Israel, and then gained 
momentum with the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.7   
Almond, Appleby, and Sivan describe in Strong Religion, the basic 
ideological and organizational characteristics that make up fundamentalist 
movements.  The authors break these down into five ideological and four 
organizational characteristics.  The first of the ideological characteristics is that 
fundamentalism is, at heart, reactive.  It is a reaction “in defense against the 
processes and consequences of secularization and modernization that have 
penetrated the larger religious community.”8  The reaction is a “militant effort to 
counteract this trend.”9  Second, fundamentalism is selective.  Fundamentalist 
groups focus on aspects of their traditions that separate them or identify them as 
being different.  This is of particular importance when considering the role of 
women and how easily this can be used as a marker of identity.  Third, 
fundamentalist groups embrace a “moral manichaeanism” or an extreme view of 
                                            
6 Dictionary: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/Fundamentalism, cited 2 September 
2007. 
7 Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, Islam, Gender, and Social Change, ed. Yvonne Yazbeck and 
John Esposito (New York, Oxford University Press, 1998) 5. 
8 Gabriel A. Almond and Emmanuel Sivan, Strong Religion, (Chicago, University of Chicago 
Press, 2003), 93. 
9 Ibid. 
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good and evil where there is no middle ground.10  This trait ties closely to the 
fourth characteristic of absolutism, in which the fundamentalists believe they are 
completely correct and all others wrong.  The fifth characteristic is millennialism 
or messianism, which is a belief in the end of days, characterized by trials and 
tribulations, and culminates in a judgment day, at which time the “true believers” 
will be rewarded, and that this will be ushered in by the Messiah, the Savior, or 
the Hidden Imam.11 
Almond’s four organizational characteristics of fundamentalist groups are 
first, that the groups are made up of an elect or chosen membership.  Second, 
“there are sharp boundaries between the saved and the sinful.”12  Third is that 
these organizations are authoritarian in their organization, usually with one 
central charismatic leader.  In addition, these groups are usually characterized by 
a voluntary membership.  Almond points out that this structure is fragile since 
there can be little to no dissension, and if it does occur, it usually results in 
fragmentation, with the dissenters either forming another group or being 
absorbed back into the mainstream.  And fourth, the group establishes strict 
behavioral requirements for its members.  A concept central to this thesis is how 
these strict behavioral codes effect women and how Muslim women react to 
these codes, especially when they are not members of the fundamentalist group 
but are forced to live by its codes. 
Not all of these characteristics are essential for defining a group as 
fundamentalist, but they are found in many fundamentalist organizations.  Of 
these characteristics, the reactive nature of fundamentalist, the moral 
Manichaeanism that claims the group’s views are correct and that all others are 
wrong, and the strict behavioral requirements that characterize fundamentalist 
movements are what most often create conflict. 
                                            
10 Almond, 95.  
11 Ibid., 97.  
12 Ibid., 98. 
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2. Islamic Fundamentalism 
Lily Kakiyah Munir describes four basic tenets that Islamic fundamentalist 
groups share that are closely tied with Almond’s analysis.  These are, first, a 
strict interpretation of the Qur’an; second, they refuse to consider any other 
points of view or theologies (pluralism); third, “fundamentalists monopolize the 
truth of religious interpretation” and “they claim that they are the sole holder of 
the ‘truth’ and that their reading of the religious texts are final and 
unchallengeable”; and fourth, Islamic fundamentalists always have the traits of 
“fanaticism, exclusiveness, intolerance, radicalism, and militarism.”13  The third 
point is of particular interest when paired with the Islamic principle of taqfir – that 
of calling someone an infidel (kafir).  Fundamentalists are then able to use this 
principle to accuse any opponent, or those with differing ideals, as a kafir or of 
not being Muslim.  History is full of “liberal thinkers and scholars in the Islamic 
world that have been exiled or even punished to death” as a result of being 
labeled a kafir.14  This, in part, may be one explanation for why some Muslims 
are not vocal about disagreeing with the fundamentalists. 
Haideh Moghissi examines Islamic fundamentalism further and highlights 
three important considerations.  First is the focus on an idealized past “that can 
be retrieved by the reformation of society…  All Islamic fundamentalist 
movements share the view that the subjugation and subordination of Islamic 
societies are due to their deviation from “true” and authentic Islam.15  To correct 
this, the fundamentalists work toward purifying Islamic societies and modeling 
them after their interpretation of the Qur’an and the Sunna, such that Islamic 
fundamentalists are anti-modern. 
                                            
13 Lily Zakiyah Munir, “Islamic Fundamentalism and its Impact on Women” (paper presented 
at the Association of Asian Studies (AAS) Forum conducted at the Hilton Hotel, New York, March 
2003), 2–3. 
14 Munir, 9. 
15 Moghissi, 69. 
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Second, Moghissi describes Islamic fundamentalism as being anti-
democratic.  This is due to the basic fundamentalist principle of being 
exclusionary from other religious groups.  They believe that they are right and 
that all others are wrong.  This even applies to other Muslims and interpretations 
of Islam. 
The third characteristic of Islamic Fundamentalism, according to Moghissi, 
is that they are anti-feminist.  This is because the fundamentalists feel threatened 
by changes to gender relations;  they prefer women to occupy the same roles  
they did in pre-modern times.  This refers back to the fundamentalist idealized 
past and how they envision and interpret the Qur’an, and the Sunna, during the 
time of the prophet and the “Golden Age of Islam” under the rule of the first four 
Rightly Guided Caliphs.  These characteristics are evident in the teachings of 
Islamist and Islamic fundamentalist ideology as well as the beliefs and practices 
of Islamic fundamentalist groups.    
3. Islamism 
Islamism is a broad term that generally refers to Islamic activists that are 
seeking the creation of an Islamic state, usually through political means.  This 
encompasses three broad categories according to Haidah Mogissi.16  The first 
consists of the apolitical idealists that envision an Islamic state, but do nothing 
more than write or teach about what one might be like – this is made up of 
individuals such as clerics or jurists.  The second group consists of the Islamist 
liberal reformers who seek an Islamic state through legitimate political action and 
social reform to bring about a true Islamic state ruled by the principles of Shari’a 
law.  Muhammad Abduh and Mehdi Bazargan’s Freedom Movement are some 
examples of this type of political reformist teaching and organization.   
Dr. Jeffrey Bale uses the term Islamism to describe the far radical right of 
Political Islam.  Bale distinguishes between some definitions of Islamism that are 
                                            
16  Haideh Mogissi, 66.  
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concerned with any political movement or ideology that promotes or strives for an 
Islamic state.  Political Islam includes Islamic Socialism, Islamic Liberalism, 
Moderate/Reformist Islam, and Islamism – all of which promote and work toward 
an Islamic state.  The first three, Islamic Socialism, Liberalism, and Reformism 
are all reconcilers in that they do not view Islam and the West as being 
completely at odds.  Instead, they attempt to reconcile Western and Islamic 
principles.  Islamism on the other hand, completely rejects anything that the West 
may have to offer.  So, according to Bale, Islamism is even more militant and 
aggressive in its ideology toward the rest of the world:  
The principal ideological characteristics of Islamism in all its forms 
are a radical rejection of Western Secular values, an intrinsic 
resistance to Western political, economic, social, and cultural 
influence over the Muslim world, an extreme hostility towards less 
committed and militant Muslims, and an affirmation of the 
importance of creating a truly Islamic state modeled on the strictest 
tenants of shari’a,  and the exemplary behavior of Muhammed 
himself, his most loyal companions (both the original Meccan 
‘emigres’ (muhajirun) and their Medinan ‘supporters’ (ansar), and 
their devout immediate successors, who are collectively known as 
the ‘virtuous forefathers’ (al-salaf al-salihin) of the faith.17  
Most scholars and writers on the subject use the term Islamism to 
describe the current activist movement in the Muslim world.  In addition, Islamists 
reference many of the same Islamist ideologues that have written extensively on 
what they believe to be the proper role of Islam in the world.  This thesis will also 
use the term Islamism and Islamist to reference and describe this ideology and 
how it has and is impacting the world today. 
4. Islamist Ideologues 
Current Islamist groups reference many of the same Islamic thinkers as a 
source or basis for their ideology.  Hasan al-Bana, an Egyptian ideologue and 
founder of the Muslim Brotherhood who wrote in the 1920’s and 1930’s, declared 
                                            
17 Jeffrey M. Bale, “Islamism” in Richard F. Pilch and Raymond A. Zilinkas, Encyclopedia of 
Bioterrorism Defense (Hoboken, N.J., 2005), 297. 
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that a “women’s place is the home, and their primary roles are mother, wife, and 
housekeeper; he [al-Bana] prohibits social mixing between men and women.”18  
Most of al-Bana’s writing addressed economic, political, social, and moral issues 
as they pertain to Islam; he wrote only one essay on women.  His importance as 
the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, however, gave this article extra 
importance.  
Another important ideologue is Abu al-‘Ala Mawdudi, who formed the 
political party Jamaati al Islami in Pakistan and wrote on the nature of an Islamic 
state.  Mawdudi wrote extensively on the subject of women in Islam, publishing 
two books on the topic and several articles.  Mawdudi espoused maintaining the 
honor and chastity of women, for which women must be kept housebound and in 
purdah – the seclusion of women from the sight of men or strangers – practiced 
by some Muslims and Hindus.   
One of the most prominent Islamist ideologues at the heart of current 
Islamism is Sayyid Qutb.  Sayyid Qutb is the modern author most frequently 
referenced by current Jihadist groups, and his ideas and interpretation of the 
Qur’an have been a guiding force for the Islamists.19  Sayyid Qutb insisted that 
“modern Muslims had become so corrupt and spiritually bankrupt that they were 
ignorant and barbarous (jahili) as the polytheistic tribal societies in pre-Islamic 
Arabia, which meant that they had to be destroyed and replaced by a true Islamic 
society.”20  Central to Qutb’s views on women is “the limitation of women’s duties 
in society to that of wife and mother.  This is not her sole role but her sole 
identity, for marriage in Islam is seen as a central institution around which is built 
society and civilization.”21  Qutb emphasized the role of family and marriage as 
                                            
18 Munir,  3. 
19 William McCants and others, ed., “Militant Ideology Atlas” (Combating Terrorism Center, 
West Point, New York, Nov. 2006), 13. 
20 Bale, 297. 
21 Lumia Rustum Shehadeh, “Women in the Discourse of Sayyid Qutb,” Arab Studies 
Quarterly (Summer 2000), found on line at 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2501/is_3_22/ai_66938022/print, accessed 8 August 2007. 
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being sacred to Islam.  He urged in his writing that all manifestations of 
Westernism or secularism be purged from Islam.  Women’s roles in Islam were a 
potent symbol of this secularism that he railed against.  “A woman fulfills her 
function by being a wife and mother, while that of a man is to be the undisputed 
authority, the breadwinner and the active member in public life.”22  Qutb 
continues by saying that a woman’s “entire organic and physiological formation is 
shaped to procreate men and prepare them for both jihad and life.”23  “Thus, in a 
Muslim community, Qutb expounds that feminists or liberal demands for women’s 
liberation become meaningless.  Accorded rights and duties in conformity with 
her biological, mental, and emotional constitution, a woman is bound to be 
content in discharging a sacred task that is utterly an outward manifestation of 
her innermost being.”24   
Qutb addresses what he calls “the new vanguard” for his vision of the 
Islamic community and emphasizes that they should devote their attention to “the 
formation of the Muslim female so that she would raise a proper Muslim family.  
Unless these recommendations are adhered to, the construction of the Islamic 
community shall be delayed for a long time.”25  This type of teaching has led 
Islamist groups to make the “women question” of Islam one of their top priorities 
with dress, mobility, and the general status of women being one of their core 
theologies and political agendas.26 
Qutb’s influence can be seen in nearly all of the Islamist groups that are 
currently active.  Though there may be some differences in their interpretation of 
what they envisage as an Islamic state or in their methods of creating that state, 
invariably women and their roles in Muslim society are at the top of their agenda 
and policies for the creation of that state.  Groups such as al Qaeda, the Muslim 
                                            
22 Youseff M. Choueiri, Islamic Fundamentalism (Twayne Publishers, Boston, Massachusetts 
1990), 127. 
23 Choueiri, 128. 
24 Ibid, 129. 
25 Ibid. 
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Brotherhood, the Tanzim al-Jihad (Jihad Group), the Groupe Islamique Arme or 
Armed Islamic Group (GIA), al-Jihad al Islami (Islamic Jihad) – just to name a 
few – are groups that have embraced this far right radical ideology.  It is this 
ideology that is recognized as a threat to U.S. interests as well as to the rights 
and freedoms of people throughout the world to live and choose the type of 
government and rules that they wish to live under.   
B. CONCLUSION 
These are the terms and some of the key ideologies of Islamism that are 
at the heart of what is occurring in the Muslim world and how it is adjusting to the 
pressures of modernization that are occurring around it and within it.  This thesis 
will use the term Islamism and Islamists to describe these new radical Islamic 
movements.  There are numerous terms that have been used to describe these 
groups or this ideology, but the core characteristics of Islamism that have been 
described here are at the heart of the discourse on the role of women in Islam.  
In addition, most of the literature from the academic community in the field of 
Islamic studies uses the term Islamism to describe this far right radical ideology.    
Nearly all of the current Islamic Jihadist groups are based on this ideology; 
therefore understanding this ideology is critical in combating it as well as in 
reaching out to others who are fighting the same battle – Muslim women.  To 
quote Lisa Taraki again, “One of the most striking features of Islamist movements 
throughout the Arab world is their preoccupation with the ‘women question.’”27  It 
is at the heart of the Islamists’ agenda and is one of the most visible symbols of 
the ideology represented by the dress and visibility of women in the public 
sphere.  It is this basic threat that unites women and women’s groups in the 
Muslim world in resisting the Islamists’ control, the spread of this ideology, and 
the violence that is always associated with it. 
  
                                            
26 Kandiyoti, 9. 
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III. FEMINISM IN THE MUSLIM WORLD 
A. FEMINISM IN THE SHADOW OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 
“Islamists... most often have used women as markers of cultural 
authenticity or, alternately, the decadent and immorality (jāhiliyya) of the 
community.”28  In a study conducted by Marty Riesbrodt, he concludes, “…what 
fundamentalist cannot prevent in the way of structural transformation they 
attempt to impose symbolically.”29  It is clear that “the control of female sexuality 
looms large in the language employed by fundamentalists” and to a greater 
extent, experienced by women living under its sway.30  “Feminist organizations 
from Algeria to Malaysia have warned that Islamist [Islamic fundamentalist] 
power-sharing would, in fact, reverse the educational and social gains of the post 
independence period, remove women from public life, and again restrict their 
roles solely to that of wife and mother.”31  In short, the issue of women’s status 
has become one of the most significant identifiers of Islamic fundamentalist 
ideology.   
This chapter will examine the Social Movement Theory (SMT) as it relates 
to feminism in the Muslim world and the effort to address the “woman question.”  
SMT provides an effective tool for analyzing the dynamics that groups play in 
social action.  The value of SMT is that it uses established comparative political 
theories and methodologies, such as rational choice, and structural, and cultural 
comparative frameworks that are useful in examining the dynamic environment in 
                                            
28 Michaelle Browers, “The Centrality and Marginalization of Women in the Political 
Discourse of Arab Nationalists and Islamists,” Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies, Vol. 2, 
No. 2 (Spring 2006): 22. 
29 Malise Ruthven, Fundamentalism: A Very Short Introduction (New York, Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 65. 
30 Ibid, 64. 
31 John Esposito, Islam, Gender, and Social Change, ed. Yvonne Yazbeck and John 
Esposito (New York, Oxford University Press, 1998) xi.  
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which these movements take place.32  Three key elements of SMT that will be 
used to analyze the cases are political opportunity, resource mobilization, and 
cultural framing.   
In determining political opportunity, there are three main elements of 
analysis that must be answered.33  First, is the government or leadership 
inclusive or exclusive toward the opposition or challenge?  Second, what are the 
opportunities or constraints placed on the movement?  And third, what change 
occurred that affected the group or movement, such as a change of leadership, 
policy, or legal changes?  Analyzing these factors provides the context in which 
the group or movement operates.     
Resource mobilization is the second key element of SMT.  SMT analyzes 
the mobilizing structures that emerge and develop in support of a movement or 
group.  This can be formal, such as a political party, professional association or a 
student union; or, these structures can be informal, such as a group of friends, or 
a study group.  Resources also include time, interests, money, external support, 
and the political space or opportunity to even exist.  “It is through these structures 
that movements recruit like-minded individuals, socialize new participants, 
overcome the free rider problem, and mobilize contention.”34  
The third important element of SMT is cultural framing.  “[T]he goal of 
framing is to vilify or de-credential the opposition while validating and legitimating 
the goals and stated purpose of one’s own group.”35  Framing provides identity, 
loyalty, and solidarity, and can help shape societal or cultural perceptions.  One 
important consideration that SMT provides is that “culture is conceptualized as 
multilayered.  First, every society has a variety of stories, symbols, and histories 
that make up something of a collective tool box.”  It is from this tool box that the 
                                            
32 Maj Jenifer Chandler, USAF, “The Explanatory Value of Social Movement Theory,” 
Strategic Insights, Vol. IV, Issue 5 (May 2005).  
33 Ibid.  
34 Glenn E. Robinson, “Hamas as Social Movement,” in Islamic Activism: a Social Movement 
Theory Approach (Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 2004), 116.   
35 Chandler. 
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feminist movement drawn its greatest strength.  The important symbolism is that 
women inside the Muslim culture cannot be overlooked.  It is this symbolism that 
the Muslim feminist movement in has used to challenge Islamic fundamentalism. 
Other academics have used SMT to examine the growth of Islamism, such 
as the Nationalists’ defeat in the 1967 war with Israel.36  The use of SMT to 
analyze the growth of Islamism is useful because it is this movement and its 
success in gaining political power, and the subsequent policies in countries 
throughout the region, that has led to the growth of feminism in the Muslim world 
and provided some common points of comparison.   
Feminism has experienced widespread growth in the Muslim world with 
numerous groups emerging in response to changes throughout the region.  
Specifically, liberal feminism and Islamic feminism are two such movements that 
have emerged in response to Islamic fundamentalist ideologies.  These 
movements have grown out of the changes in the political opportunity structures: 
in some cases from the increases in access or freedom and in other instances, 
from the repression of their rights.  Liberal feminism is concerned with the legal 
changes and has emerged with its own mobilizing structures and its own means 
of framing the “woman question.”  Islamic feminism seeks to redefine the 
understanding of the rights and roles of Muslim women from their own 
perspective, instead of what they see as the male-dominated interpretation of 
Islam’s sacred texts and traditions.  Islamic feminism is framing the issue in 
terms of what they feel is a patriarchic, misogynistic interpretation of Islam that 
deprives them of what they believe Islam really provides.   
B. FEMINISM 
There are numerous definitions of feminism.  Margot Badran argues, 
“Feminisms are produced in particular places and are articulated in local 
                                            
36 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Introduction, Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory,” in 
Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach (Bloomington, IN, Indiana University 
Press, 2004) 7.  
 18
terms.”37  This has led to feminism taking on its own form in the Muslim world.  In 
general terms, feminism is the belief in the social, political, and economic equality 
of the sexes and the movement organized around this belief, which is a typical 
definition of feminism.38   
Most of the leading feminist thinkers that have emerged from the Muslim 
world have written extensively on the role that Islamic fundamentalist ideology 
has had on women in that region and have helped to frame the differences 
between the Islamic fundamentalists and the feminists.  Haidah Mogissi, an 
Iranian born sociology and women’s studies professor, expands on the basic 
principles of fundamentalism and describes Islamic fundamentalists as being 
anti-modern, anti-democracy, and anti-feminist as well as being utopian in nature 
and oriented in the past.39  The myth, or utopian ideal, is rooted in the illusion 
that a return to idealized traditional, patriarchal relations is the solution to the 
current social, economic, and political problems.  Fatima Mernissi, a Moroccan 
Sociologist, describes fundamentalism as an “assertion of identity in the face of 
rapid social changes threatening existing authority relations (especially between 
genders),” which makes women’s rights a central part of the Islamists’ agenda in 
terms of Islamization programs such as dress, mobility, and general status.40  
This pressure is at the social, political, and religious levels of Muslim societies.  
Socially, women are pressured by the view of what makes a woman a good 
Muslim due to the widespread control that Islamists have been able to assert.  
“Islamic groups demand a return to the pristine Islam of the first Muslim  
 
 
                                            
37 Margot Badran, “Islamic Feminism: What’s in a Name?” Al-Ahram Weekly Online, 17–23 
January 2002, Issue No. 569.  
38 The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition. Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 2004. [Web Site] http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/feminism (accessed: 
October 24, 2007). 
39 Haidah Moghissi, Feminism and Islamic Feminism, (Zed Books, London, 1999), 70. 
40 Deniz Kandiyoti, “Women, Islam and the State,” Middle East Report, (November – 
December 1991), 9. 
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community in the seventh century Arabia, the establishment of an Islamic state, 
and implementation of Islamic laws as formulated by the classical jurists of those 
first centuries of Islam.”41    
More and more attention is being paid to feminism and its impact and 
potential impact in the Muslim world.  Valentine Moghadam and Fatima Sadiqi 
propose that “the public sphere in a number of MENA countries is changing and 
civil society is becoming ‘feminized’ due to women’s greater social participation, 
the proliferation of women’s organizations, their involvement in or initiation of 
public debates and national dialogues, and their access to various forms of 
media.”42  Of specific importance is the belief that this new feminism is not 
modeled after Western feminism but is being based on the Muslim world’s own 
culture and religious identity.  The movement away from westernized feminism is 
partially due to the growth of Islamic fundamentalism, as well as needing a 
feminist ideology that is based on their socio-cultural foundations, not just the 
import of a Western idea.  The result is that feminism has taken on its own form 
in the Muslim world.  Feminism has inspired several types of social movements. 
The two most prominent and recognizable forms are Islamic feminism, which 
specifically studies the Qur’an and the Sunna from a women’s point of view and 
offers its interpretations, and liberal feminism, which addresses the legal aspects 
of women in their respective countries.  Both have similar goals and objectives 
that overlap each other in many ways.  For this thesis, liberal feminism will 
address more of the secular effort to effect legal changes, while Islamic feminism 
will address the effort to change laws within Shari’a due to the inseparable nature 
of Shari’a with Islamic jurisprudence. 
Within the framework of the Social Movement theory, two forms of 
feminism that are of importance and have taken on their own type of emphasis 
                                            
41 Nora Murat, “Sisters in Islam: Advocacy for Change within the Religious Framework,” 
Women Living Under Muslim Laws [Web site] http://www.wluml.org/english/pubs/pdf/wsf/17.pdf 
accessed 28 October 2007. 
42 Valentine Moghadam and Fatima Sadiqi, “Women’s Activism and the Public Sphere,” 
Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Spring 2006), 1. 
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and activism, when examining the Muslim world, are liberal feminism and Islamic 
feminism.  This is not to say that these are the only feminist movements; there 
are many other forms of feminism that are active in Muslim countries, often with 
overlapping ideologies.  Liberal feminism and Islamic feminism are  
representative of these movements because they are clearly defined and  visible, 
both in terms of action and in organizations that are involved in the support of 
their feminist ideology.  In addition, these two movements reflect the socio-
cultural differences that are present in the Muslim world that has led to the 
growth of feminism and women’s groups in that region.  But their real importance 
is that they are at the heart of the issue in regards to Islamism.  Both of these 
movements frame their arguments and positions as a means of competing 
against what they view as a means of repression – the policies and ideology of 
the Islamists.  Understanding liberal and Islamic feminism is therefore critical in 
creating policies that would enable the enlistment of Muslim organizations within 
MENA as a means of countering Islamism.   
C. LIBERAL FEMINISM 
Liberal feminism has its ideological basis in the equality of men and 
women.  Liberal feminists believe that women should have the same 
opportunities politically, economically, and socially that are available to men.  To 
accomplish these ideals, Liberal feminists attempt to change the laws that they 
view as affording or creating unequal rights or opportunities for women and by 
crafting new legislation.  Ziba Mir-Hosseini, a feminist and anthropologist from 
Iran offers the following perspective of Liberal feminism in light of the 1979 
Iranian Revolution: 
Like most Iranian women, I strongly supported the 1979 Revolution 
and believed in the Justice of Islam.  But I soon found out that in an 
Islamic state that was and was committed to the application of 
Shari’a, the backbone of the Islamist project; I was a second class 
citizen.  This brought me to the realization that the justice of Islam 
in modern times cannot be achieved without the ‘modernization’ 
and ‘democratization’ of its legal vision.  For this, Islamic discourses 
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and Islamists must come to terms with the issue of rights, 
especially those of women.  The justice of Islam is no longer 
reflected in the laws that some Islamists are intent on enforcing in 
the name of Shari’a.43   
In Muslim countries, this primarily takes the form of addressing national 
laws, particularly family law.  Family law governs marriage, divorce, child 
custody, and inheritance laws.  Nadia Hijab argues that in Arab nations that have 
constitutions, the nations provide for women’s political rights in accordance with 
international laws and United Nations Conventions, but family laws “do not 
provide for equality between the sexes because they have been developed within 
the Islamic framework in all Arab countries.”44  She goes on to argue, “[M]ost 
family laws, as they currently stand, contradict the provisions of the constitutions 
and the labor laws that have been decreed.”45  Another example of liberal 
feminist type arguments is the issue of veiling.  “For example, a dress code 
practiced in past centuries in certain communities is propagated as ‘Islamic’ and 
people are forced to adopt it as a symbol or their ‘Islamic’ identity.”46  These laws 
are being challenged across the Muslim World by liberal feminist organizations 
and others. 
These are just a couple of the types of laws that liberal feminists are 
working to change.  This effort has taken on several different forms; the first is on 
the national level, where liberal feminists are working to change the laws of their 
country.  Liberal feminists are also working at the regional and international 
levels and are being assisted through the United Nations and various Non 
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Governmental Organizations.  For example, the UN has held regional meetings 
in preparation for the United Nations’ World Conference on Women, which crafts 
goals and strategies to address women’s rights in the region and by country to 
bring them in line with the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).  This convention, when ratified by a 
country, is a pledge to bring their laws in line with the Convention.  This regional 
and international focus has helped women’s groups to work together in the 
region.  The sharing of information has helped to identify which laws reflect their 
Islamic heritage and which laws are based on pre-Islamic patriarchal tribal codes 
that need to be changed or reinterpreted to reflect the changes and realities of 
today’s world.  Some of the laws in question are mandatory veiling laws, 
women’s right to work laws, and inheritance laws. One specific example that 
continues to be addressed on national, regional, and international levels is that of 
equating rape to adultery in Pakistan.47  The law was enacted in 1979 by 
General Zia ul-Haq, the military ruler of Pakistan from 1977 to 1988.  The law 
required the same burden of proof for rape as it did for adultery, which according 
to Shari’a requires four eyewitnesses.  In 1981, the law was challenged in the 
federal Shari’a court and found to be un-Islamic, but was reinstated shortly 
thereafter due to political pressure.  This law is still in effect, though it is being 
challenged by groups internal to Pakistan and other regional and international 
liberal feminist organizations. 
In addition to the efforts of the United Nations, Non Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) have assisted liberal feminist movements in MENA.  
During the 1994 Arab regional meeting, which was drafting plans of action to be 
introduced at the United Nations’ Fourth World Conference on Women, NGOs 
took on greater involvement in feminist activism.  In addition to international 
NGOs, this regional meeting included representation from several North African 
countries.  Activist Nadia Hijab noted, “There was an interesting dynamic 
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between the different groups, which led to a watershed in the way women’s 
issues in the region are discussed.  NGO’s learned how to ‘lobby’ governments 
to get their views reflected…  NGOs were responsible for introducing several 
new sections.”48  The NGO involvement was noticeable both in its level of 
influence and by its sheer numbers.  The UN had only expected around three 
hundred NGOs; over nine hundred actually came.  These represented numerous 
interests “from welfare and charitable institutions, to family planning associations, 
to legal rights groups and human rights groups.”49 
An example of these interesting dynamics can be seen in the 
disagreement between Sudan and Algeria.  During the conference, the 
representative from Sudan protested the draft text that was being developed in 
regards to women’s rights on cultural and religious grounds.  Algeria 
counterbalanced the objections by the Sudanese representative.  The Algerian 
delegates “spoke forcefully and movingly against the misuse of Islam as a tool for 
terror against women,” and the Algerian minister went so far as to describe, 
“…how fundamentalists were seeking to impose the veil and to prevent women 
form participation in public life, going so far as to attack schools and 
schoolgirls.”50  The Algerian minister received a standing ovation from the 
assembled representatives and NGOs for his remarks.  Nadia Hijab sums up the 
effect that is being felt in MENA and provides further room for involvement and 
influence: 
There has been a qualitative change in the way women’s activists 
work at the national level.  Many have moved beyond the elites in 
the capital city to undertake outreach activities at the grassroots 
level, where they are in contact with the reality of women’s lives.  
And many Arab women participate in international conferences, 
where they learn from and contribute to the international debate, 
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and they have therefore gained confidence and expertise in 
articulating the issues they face in international terms.51 
Liberal feminists are actively engaged in working to change laws that directly 
effect women and are seen as being repressive or unjust.  The three case 
studies of Iran, Afghanistan, and Algeria provide specific examples of liberal 
feminist groups, how and why they emerged, how they are mobilizing, how they 
are framing their arguments, and what successes, if any, they have had.   
D. ISLAMIC FEMINISTS 
Closely related to the work of liberal feminists is Islamic feminism.  Islamic 
feminism emerged from the Iranian revolution as a result of the oppression of 
women that followed Ayatollah Khomeini’s consolidation of power and the 
subsequent crackdown on existing gender relations, which Islamic 
fundamentalist groups such as Fedayan-i Islam denounced as being un-Islamic 
and Western.  Ziba Mir-Hosseini refers to Islamic feminism as “a term that 
continues to be contested by both the majority of Islamists and some feminists, 
who see it as antithical [sp] to their respective positions and ideologies.”52  The 
term originated in Iran in the 1990s in the Teheran women’s journal Zanan, 
“describing it as an Islamic project of rereading the Qur’an, women-centered 
readings of religious texts, or ‘scholarship-activism’ as it is referred to in the 2001 
book Windows of Faith edited by Gisela Webb.”53  One of the main difficulties 
with the term is that most of the producers and writers of Islamic feminism do not 
refer to themselves as feminists.  But the term is becoming widely accepted and 
used, particularly with the Muslim Diaspora on the Internet.54  
According to the Emir of Qatar’s wife, Sheikha Mozah Bint Nasser Al 
Missned, “Islamist principles do not have to be at odds with women’s rights.”  
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Speaking to Carnegie Mellon graduates at the 2006 commencement ceremony, 
she highlighted the importance Islam accords to women: 
Islam has always guaranteed the full rights of women and women 
have always occupied a central role in Islamic civilizations.  It is 
important for Muslim women, and particularly women form the Arab 
peninsula, to reclaim their OWN history, to recall figures like 
Ayesha, the wife of the prophet, whose thoughts and recollections 
formed a central part of Islamic scholarship; Nasiban bin Ka’ab the 
women warrior who fought in the battle of Uhud; and the scores of 
business women, judges, scholars and poets that people Islamic 
history…  It is important to remember that these women were 
consulted in forming legislative order in Islamic societies and they 
heavily influenced policies that were to govern social, political, 
economical, and military issues.  These same policies are the 
matrix of our life today.55   
Another line of argument used by Islamic feminists is that “all traditional 
Quran interpretations were written by men.”56  Not only were they men, but they 
wrote during a time and in a cultural setting where the equality of women was not 
a reality of their daily lives, but reflected their own tribal and cultural heritages.  It 
is this problem with interpretation that has allowed the patriarchic principles to 
become so pervasive.  “They point out that classical, and also much of post-
classical interpretation was based on men’s experiences, male-centered 
questions, and the overall influence of the patriarchal societies in which they 
lived.”57   
Islamic feminists are using several different methods to counter these 
traditional interpretations of the faith.  One method is to use hermeneutics to 
analyze the Qur’an.  Hermeneutics is the method of interpreting and 
understanding the text.  For the Islamic feminists, this involves a careful analysis 
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of each word and how it is used in context, and using comparable words 
elsewhere in the Qur’an to better understand how the word or text should be 
translated.  This study also entails a contextual analysis of the surrounding 
culture and what was occurring during the time, as well as how other Islamic 
scholars have interpreted the text.  Islamic feminists’ principle argument is that 
the Qur’an declares men and women as equal.  Not only is this reflected in the 
language of the Quran, but activists also look at historical examples of women 
from early Islam as evidence of the equality of women during the life of 
Mohammed, as well as during the period under the Caliphs.  One example of this 
approach is the book For Ourselves: Women Reading the Quran, which was 
published by the international women’s organization, “Women Living Under 
Muslim Laws,” and is available on-line through their website.  The authors 
describe this work as “a reflection of the many voices of women who interpret the 
Qur'an and engage with it in the context of their lived realities.”  As such, it does 
not offer an alternative blueprint for a brighter future for women in Muslim 
countries and communities, but simply forms part of the many challenges to 
monolithic, often male-dominated interpretations of the Qur'an and Muslim 
laws.”58  The case studies of Iran, Afghanistan, and Algeria offer specific 
examples of how Islamic feminist groups are mobilizing and framing their 
argument against radical Islamic fundamentalism.   
E. CONCLUSION 
Social Movement Theory will enable a focused understanding of the 
feminist movement in Muslim countries by examining the three case studies – 
Iran, Afghanistan, and Algeria, and what the ramifications might be on U.S. 
policy.  The importance of the current feminist movement is best expressed by 
Margot Badran’s analysis: “The oppressiveness of Islamism is leading these 
women not to abandon Islam but to question issues of gender within Islam and 
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possibly abandon Islamism.”59  The abandonment of Islamism and its 
accompanying Islamic fundamentalist ideology is exactly what the United States 
wants to have happen in response to the violence that has emanated as a result 
of its extreme fundamentalism.  Mojab cites other academics and scholars who 
are optimistic about prospects for women’s rights in Iran. They believe that a 
reinterpretation of Islam, together with lobbying, will eventually pave the way for 
granting women equal rights with men.60  When viewed in the larger context of 
the Muslim world, the argument can be made that both the legal changes that 
liberal feminists are working toward, and a new understanding of Islam that the 
Islamic feminists are working toward, would help women’s rights in the region.  
This combined effort between liberal feminists and Islamic feminists has the 
potential to act as a buffer against the spread or incursion of the more radical 
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF WOMEN IN AN ISLAMIC STATE: 
WOMEN IN IRAN, ALGERIA, AND AFGHANISTAN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Women throughout the Muslim world are at the crossroads of radical 
Islamist Ideology and modernization.  Over the last century in Afghanistan, Iran, 
and Algeria women have seen an over all improvement of their rights.  But in 
each of these cases, the expansion of women’s rights came to an abrupt stop 
and in effect turned the hands of time back to a time when women had little say 
in society as the result of Islamism taking hold in their countries.  Women in 
Afghanistan, Iran, and Algeria were clearly affected by the Islamization of their 
countries and continue to be threatened by Islamism and its policies.  This has 
occurred both at the political, societal, and at the personal level.   
These case studies show that in these three countries that women have 
mobilized to challenge Islamist Ideology.  This mobilization has occurred in 
response to the broken promises made to women by the Islamists and the 
subsequent repression of their rights.  Women, when faced with the severe 
interpretation of Islamism, are most at risk, and have the most to loose if the 
Islamists are successful in creating their view of an Islamic state.  Therefore 
women and women’s organizations can be a valuable ally in the war of ideas. 
The United States should actively engage women and women’s 
organizations in the Muslim world to assist their activities and to strengthen U.S. 
efforts in limiting the impact of Islamism.  This effort should use both direct and 
indirect methods in bolstering women’s challenge to Islamism.  Engagement 
should entail aligning U.S. foreign policy in a more consistent manner that places 
emphasis on women’s role in resisting Islamism, as well as conducting an 
information campaign to inform and influence targeted populations of the danger 
that Islamism poses to them and portrays women’s efforts positively in resisting 
the repressive policies of the Islamists. 
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The chapter is divided into four sections.  The first section examines 
women and women’s organizations in Iran and finds that the initial support that 
women and women’s groups gave to the Islamist, quickly changed as a result of 
the broken promises of freedom in the name of Islam and the rights and 
freedoms they had enjoyed were stripped away.  Iranian women and women’s 
groups have been working at reversing those losses and have had some 
success.  The second section will examine women and women’s organizations in 
Algeria.  Again, women who had fought as a part in the war for Independence 
were betrayed by the passing of the Family Code by the Islamists.  Women 
mobilized to confront the loss of their rights and continued to challenge the 
Islamists throughout the Algerian civil war.  Women’s activism in Algeria resulted 
in the repeal of the Family Code and has reduced the influence of the Islamists.  
The third section will look at women and women’s groups in Afghanistan that 
were mobilized by severe repression of the Taliban.  Women’s groups were 
unable to effect much change under the Taliban, but the groups that were formed 
are working towards educating and equipping women to be a part of 
Afghanistan’s future.  Section four concludes with a summary of thoughts and 
findings that have implications for future work with women and women’s groups 
in resisting the influence of Islamism. 
B. IRAN  
1. Iran Introduction 
If the Jihadists and Islamists are seeking the creation of an Islamic State 
or a nation ruled by Shari’a law, one must look at Iran as a model for what an 
Islamic State might look like.  The Islamists use Iran as an example of an Islamic 
State in general terms because of the differences between Sunni’s and Shia.    
Globally, Islamists saw Iran as a success in their quest for the creation of an 
Islamic state which in turn gave new hope to Islamists in other countries.   
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Iran is an important case study because it depicts the impact of Islamism 
on women living currently in an Islamic state under Islamist principles and 
policies.  Iran also provides a different environment to analyze because it was 
never a colony of a western power, so the women’s movement that exists there 
is more of its own making.  Iran is also important because of the wide array of 
women and women’s groups that have emerged to voice their dissent at the 
Islamists policies under which they are forced to live.  This chapter will 
demonstrate that the broken promises and repression by the Islamists after the 
1979 Iranian Revolution created the political opportunity for women and women’s 
organizations to form organizations and voice their opposition to Islamism.  
Women’s activism has resulted in a positive shift of perceptions among the 
Iranian people and has had success in having some oppressive laws changed 
but this women’s movement has yet to have a lasting impact on the government 
due to the continued repression of women. 
2. History of Women’s Rights in Iran 
The women’s movement in Iran began with the Constitutional Revolution 
of 1906 -1911.  This revolution resulted in the creation of a constitutional 
monarchy that began to embrace modernization.  A women’s movement was a 
part of this revolution and envisaged greater freedom for women as an important 
step in the modernization of Iran.61  Women even garnered support for suffrage 
in 1911, when a male representative to parliament submitted a petition for 
women’s suffrage.62  This inspired an American advisor to the Iranian 
government to write, “The Persian women since 1907 had become almost at a 
bound the most progressive, not to say radical, in the world.”63   
                                            
61 Nahid Yeganeh, “Women, Nationalism and Islam in Contemporary Political Discourse in 
Iran” (Feminist Review, No. 44, Nationalisms and National Identities, Summer 1993)  4.  
62 Shahrzad Mojab, “Theorizing the Politics of ‘Islamic Feminism’” (Feminist Review, No. 69, 
Winter 2001)  128.  
63 Ibid. 
 32
The next evolution of women’s rights in Iran was under the rule of Reza 
Shah Pahlavi (1925–1941).  His goal was to further modernize Iran in which the 
state became an engine for social reform.64  Reza established a state sponsored 
women’s organization.  Some of Reza’s social reforms were the unveiling of 
women, free education for women and girls, and the right to work.  Reza’s 
changes occurred despite opposition from Shia clerics.  Reza’s reforms did not 
transfer over to the realm of family policies, which were still dominated by the 
Shia establishment.  The Civil Code of 1936 evidences this.  These laws allowed 
polygamy, divorce, custody rights - which belonged to men and not women, and 
women were not allowed to travel or to go to school without a man’s written 
approval, or go to work without approval.65   
The next series of advancements happened form 1941–1979 under the 
Shah, Mohammed Reza Shah.  His reign, in the post World War II and colonial 
period, was characterized by political repression paired with social modernization 
and capitalism.  The women’s movement continued to develop focusing on 
women’s legal status.  In 1963, women gained the right to vote.  The state also 
granted them equal education and employment.  Women were still not treated 
equally in these areas with state policies encouraging them to work in feminine 
professions and received lower pay then their male counterparts.   
The Family Protection Law (1967 and 1975) maintained the premises that 
women were the property of men.66  The law did seek to curb abuses by males 
and created a family protection court that had jurisdiction over divorce and 
custody.  Women also gained a little more latitude in asking for divorce, tightened 
polygamy rules for men, increased in the minimum age of marriage, and abortion 
under specific circumstances was legalized.67  These laws did not stop or 
remove the dominance of the patriarchic system but did modernize them.   
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These changes to the position of women became a seed of discontent.   
Since the state had made a claim to women’s liberation and the 
secular opposition had not constructed an alternative gender policy 
to that of the state, the gender aspect of the demand for the 
overthrow of the Pahlavi state became the preserve of the Islamic 
opposition.68   
The Islamic opposition appealed to women to reject the states 
“Westernized” view of women.   
The radical demand for overthrow of the Pahlavi regime and its 
gender policies found credence with both religious and secular 
women because it promised political freedom, economic equality, 
social justice, cultural integrity, and personal fulfillment.  It resulted 
in massive participation of women in the Iranian Revolution of 1979 
which brought about the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty and the 
establishment of the Islamic Republic.69   
It took about two years for Ayatollah Khomeini to consolidate his position 
and for the completion of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic.  The 
Constitution “gave a prominent place to women, defining them as both mothers 
and citizens, and regarded the establishment of an Islamic nation as dependent 
on the Islamization of women’s position.”70  A cornerstone of this ideology was 
the “patriarchal relations which strengthened the male control over women in the 
family while granting women the right to be active participants in society.”71 
The process of the Islamization of women has been referred to as sexual 
apartheid.72  Ayatollah Khomeini abolished the Family Protection Laws of 1967 
and 1975 and the family courts jurisdiction over divorce and custody.  The state 
declared the existing gender relations were un-Islamic and were Western and re-
imposed the veil on all Iranian women.   
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Islamization was achieved through gender segregation in the 
education system, imposition of the hejab on women, reinforcement 
of gender division of subjects, and preservation of male dominance 
in education.73   
Employment was another major area affected by Islamization.  Ayatollah 
Khomeini called for an ‘Administrative Revolution’ in 1980 that focused on 
imposing the hejab, segregating male and female workers, firing non-Islamic 
employees, and removing secular employees with Islamic supporters.  Many 
women reacted by protesting against the mandatory wearing of the hejab which 
just resulted in them being fired. 
The real impact of the Islamization of Iran was in the area of individual 
rights.  Ayatollah Motahhari, a leading Islamic ideologue, prioritized the rights of 
the Muslim community over that of the individual and “the interests of the Muslim 
community in defining women’s appearance and sexuality takes precedence over 
women’s individual choice.”74  This was accomplished through mandatory 
wearing of the hejab and through segregation policies.  “The imposition of the 
hejab was a long an difficult one and it has become the most fiercely 
implemented policies of the Islamic Republic.”75   
These difficulties can be seen in some of the statements of Iranian women 
and reports from Non Governmental Agencies that monitor human rights.  
Numerous Non-Governmental agencies monitor and report on human rights 
abuses of which a large percentage of these concern Iran’s policies towards 
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Restrictions on personal liberty had a harsh impact on women.  In 
Nov. 1995, the security forces announced that they had detained 
86,000 suspects in the previous 12 months.  “Most of them were 
thought to have been women detained for violating the dress 
code…”.76   
Women continue to be hounded to comply with petty restrictions by 
extra-governmental enforcers of Islamic orthodoxy.  In May, police 
authorities began implementing a decree prohibiting women from 
riding in the front seats of taxis.  Detention of women for failure to 
observe the dress code continued.  In an interview, President 
Rafsanjani ”urged women to accept the limitations nature had 
imposed on them.”77 
Cites increasing arbitrary harassment of women.  In June 1993, 
police issued statements condemning women’s smiles as arousing 
corruption in men…  In August, in the city of Tabriz, hundred of 
demonstrators were arrested and some killed in protests after the 
Basji (militia) attacked young women who had mixed with men at 
the end of a soccer match.  The government forbids the mixing of 
women and men.  Reports two cases of women stoned to death for 
adultery.78  
A separate report by the United Nations, Economic and Social Council 
Commission of on Human Rights, Feb. 1994 reports the following on the situation 
in Iran: 
many women in southern Iran are beheaded by their male relatives 
for real or imagined sexual misconduct and that the killers often 
went free…  On June 24, 1993, over 800 “inadequately covered” 
women were arrested and sentenced to flogging.79 
Iran’s Islamization program, which centered on mandatory segregation 
and dress codes, were not the freedoms promised them by the revolution.  
Women continue to protest the state’s policies despite the certainty of arrest and 
                                            
76 Human Rights Watch, Mater Exhibit Series, Iran, Status of Women, produced by 
Committee for Humanitarian Assistance to Iranian Refugees, August 1997 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Master Exhibit Series, August 1997. 
 36
punishment.  A key part of this has been the continued existence of a women’s 
movement in Iran.  In addition, the women’s movement has found some support 
with moderate clerics who favor a reinterpretation of Islam or ijtihad (the 
endeavor of a Muslim scholar to derive a rule of divine law from the Koran and 
Hadith without relying on the views of other).   
3. Women’s Organizations in Post Revolution Iran 
Many of the same women and women’s organizations that had been a 
part of the Iranian revolution now turned their energies and activism on the new 
government as a result of their being denied some of the very freedoms that they 
thought they were fighting for.  This was primarily in reaction to Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s decision to remove the Family Protection Law and the imposition of 
mandatory veiling.  These events brought women into the streets to raise their 
voices in protests.  A celebration planned by groups for International Women's 
Day, March 1979, turned into a protest against Khomeini's announcement about 
the veiling of women and banning of the Family Protection Law.  Thousands of 
women gather in the streets of Tehran asking Prime Minister Bazargan to hear 
their plea.  Media reports estimate that between 15,000 and 20,000 women 
joined the protest and that even more joined the march that immediately followed 
the demonstration.80  Some of the slogans of the demonstrators were: 'Freedom 
in our culture; to stay at home is our shame' 'Liberty and equality are our 
undeniable rights' ' We will fight against compulsory veil; down with dictatorship' ' 
In the dawn of freedom, we already lack freedom' 'Women's Day of Emancipation 
is neither Western, nor Eastern, it is international' 'Freedom does not take rules  
 
 
                                            
80 Homa Hoodfar, “The Women’s Movement in Iran: Women at the Crossroads of 
Secularization and Islamization,” in The Women’s Movement Series No.1 (Winter 1999): 25. 
 37
and regulations".81  This event signaled the break of women’s support for the 
revolution and the start of a new struggle against the Islamism of Khomeini’s 
regime. 
Dr. Roksana Bahramitash, an Iranian Sociology professor at McGill 
University in Canada states: 
It was this contradiction – on one hand bringing women into the 
public domain, and on the other, giving them no legal rights and no 
recognition of their contributions – that paved the way for gender 
politics.  The irony was that while Khomeini had called for women to 
break the curfew in order to combat the previous regime, and later 
issued a fatwa calling on them to become involved in the political 
and public sphere, he did not allow them any commensurate legal 
gains in return.82 
Women and Women’s groups mobilized to face this new challenge form 
the Islamists of Khomeini’s Government.  The loss of rights and the brutal 
repression of dissent fomented the women’s movement.  Some of the post-
revolutionary Islamist women's organizations that emerged as a result of the 
Islamists were the Women's Society of Islamic Revolution, the Iranian Islamic 
Women's Institute, the Ḥaẓrat-i Khadīja Association, the Women's Solidarity 
Association, and the Social-Cultural Council of Women.  The largest and most 
influential of these organizations is the Women’s Society of the Islamic 
Revolution whose stated objective is “to develop culturally appropriate ways of 
building a society that would end women’s oppression.”83  
One approach that these groups used was Islamic feminism.  The Islamic 
feminist approach, which began in Iran, has played an enormous role in the 
women’s movement in Iran.  Due to the limited political space afforded by the 
Government of Iran, Islamic feminism has taken the lead internal to Iran in 
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confronting government and has incorporated other methods such as liberal 
feminism to its arguments.  This is due to the complete dominance of Shari’a as 
the primary legal basis for Iran.  “The secular women’s struggle, although 
important, has unfortunately been neither adequate nor widespread enough to 
change the strong religious structure of social and political life of today’s Iran.”84  
This has left Islamic feminism as the primary mobilization structure for women to 
effectively raise issues and have their voices heard in Iran.  “Islamist feminists 
established branches in provincial towns and engaged themselves in 
consciousness-raising and the promotion of their own Islamic visions on 
gender.”85  Mir-Hosseini states “Women’s legal rights in Iran must be raised and 
addressed within a religious framework, where jurisprudential construction of 
gender can be re-examined and gender inequality can be redressed.”86  
“Twenty-five years after the Islamic Revolution in Iran, we are now 
witnessing the flourishing of feminist rereading of the sacred texts, a shift some 
scholars declare to be so radical that it has no counterpart in the rest of the 
Muslim world.”87  John Espositio writes, “The early years of Islamic women’s 
activism [in Iran] generated the drive to rethink gender in Islam in new and 
sometimes radical ways.  Iran offers a good case study of reinterpretation 
(ijtehad) not simply of traditional Islamic theological and legal sources, but rather 
an effort that went directly to interpreting legal sacred texts.”88 
One of the leading resources for this discourse has been Iranian women’s 
journals and magazines that has drawn on educated Iranian women as a 
resource as well as a market.  These magazines and journals were able to raise 
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sensitive subjects that had an impact in Iranian thought.  The most prominent of 
these being Zanan (Woman), which was started in 1992.  Others magazines 
include Payam-e Zan (Women’s Message), Zan-e Ruz (Today’s Woman), 
Khanevadeh (Family), and Rah-e now (The New Way) all of which are active in 
discussing the woman question and other issues that deeply affect women in 
Iran.  One leading theme in these magazines is the continued criticism of unfair 
aspects of traditional and conventional religious beliefs and practices while 
putting forward newer conceptualizations of women in an ideal Islamic society.89   
The Islamic feminists have had success in influencing the political and 
legal process through their publications.  “They pointed out that much of what is 
being presented to women as Islamic and ‘authentic Islamic ways’ is nothing but 
‘patriarchy in Islamic costume.’”90  Women activist have used print media, 
women’s gatherings and demonstrations, and radio and television to bypass the 
government and communicate directly with the Iranian public.  This method has 
proven to be very successful.  Two examples of the success that this method had 
are changes to the Family Law and child custody for widows.   
Khomeini introduced a new Family Law after Islamic feminists conducted 
a campaign to raise awareness of the impact of temporary marriages and of men 
marrying young women and then divorcing them later.  Newspapers and 
Magazines ran stories of women who became pregnant during temporary 
marriages and then were unable to find the father.  At the same time, they were 
also featuring stories of middle age women who had been divorced and the 
husbands did not comply with financial compensation laws or pay alimony 
because they were marrying another young woman.   
Magazines and Newspapers printed open letters to the religious 
leaders asking if this was the way to achieve Islamic justice.  ”How  
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can the religious leaders and our legal system leave the fate of 
women in the hands of men who are obviously not good and fair 
Muslims?” they asked.91   
The pressure exerted resulted in Khomeini passing a new Family Law that 
specifically addressed temporary marriage and of not paying alimony after 
divorce.   
Although this law did not go as far as many Muslim women activists 
had hoped and leaves much to be desired, it was nevertheless in 
many respects, one of the more advanced marriage laws in the 
Middle East (outside Turkey and Tunisia).92 
The next success that the women activist had was the issue of child 
custody as the result of the husband and father being killed during the Iran Iraq 
War.  The law at the time gave custody to the paternal grandparent or other close 
male relative instead of the mother.  This resulted in a double loss for Iranian 
mothers who had lost a husband in the war, also lost their children.  Again, 
newspapers and magazines were at the heart of informing the public.  The 
stories featured mothers asking, “How can that be fair?” and “How can a fair 
system justify that a woman be so tortured and punished for her wholehearted 
support of the revolution?  Is this what we were promised by Islamic justice?”93  
Again, there was a public outpouring of sympathy and Ayatollah Khomeini issued 
a decree granting martyrs’ widows custody of their children. 
Both of these successes on the part of women activists demonstrate the 
success women activist had in framing the issue of women’s rights as a very 
personal manner.  These stories were not contrived but reflected a reality that the 
people of Iran could see not only in the papers, but in the lives of people that they  
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knew.  Relating the stories of women helped to inform the population, which then 
was able to exert greater influence on the government then a women’s group 
lobbying on their own. 
Another area of contention that the Islamist feminist addressed was the 
battle over the hijab.  Most Islamist feminist embrace the hejab, or veil, as a part 
of dressing modestly and as their symbolic place as a Muslim women, but they 
argued strongly against forced wearing of the hijab.  They would march in 
demonstrations against the hejab.  On numerous occasions, Islamic feminists 
would attempt to defend women not wearing a veil in those marches from police.  
They also argued that the dress code should apply equally to both men and 
women with both sexes dressing modestly.94  Demonstrations and protests over 
the hejab continue despite the crackdown by the police that has resulted in the 
arrests of hundreds of thousands of protestors and numerous deaths as reported 
by Amnesty International, the International Red Cross, and Human Rights Watch. 
Women’s groups framed part of their argument in this statement: “It is time 
for ijtihad!”95  This slogan used by Iranian women’s organizations is one of the 
ways that women framed their argument.  The single largest women’s 
mobilization since the days of the revolution occurred under this banner.  On 
June 12, 2005, over two thousand women from over 90 different organizations 
participated in a demonstration at the Tehran University to push for an 
amendment to the Iranian constitution that would allow women to run for the 
presidency.  Other women and women’s organizations also conducted 
demonstrations simultaneously in other major cities under the same banner.   
The whole argument emerged as a result of Islamic feminism analysis of 
language and early translations of Arabic.  The women’s groups were pushing for 
a wider understanding of the word jol-e siyasi (political person).  They argued 
that the word really “means ‘politically knowledgeable person,’ and that the 
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Arabic term rajul does not necessarily refer to men exclusively but rather means 
‘a person.’”96  There demonstration had little real effect in changing the 
constitution but it did demonstrate women’s ability to mobilize.   
Women and Women’s groups had some success after the death of 
Khomeini and during the presidency of Khatami.  Women and women’s groups 
were instrumental in the election of Khatami, who ran on a reformist platform.  
Khatami promised to address gender rights and other women specific political 
concerns.  The power of women as a voting block was realized when of the 88% 
percent of eligible voters, 40% of them were women.97 
After his election, Khatami expanded the Bureau of Women’s Affairs and 
more significantly appointed Massoumeh Ebtekar as the first female vice 
president of Iran.  During Khatami’s presidency, women’s political participation 
increased, with 114 representatives in 109 cities on the local councils, and the 
number of women journalists and NGO activists increased.98  Education also 
continued to improve with a jump from 52% of girls being literate in 1975 to 91% 
in 2000 and for a jump from 30% to 69% for women.99  In 2000, a study 
conducted about the awareness, attitudes, and socio-cultural behavior in Iran 
suggests that there has been a major improvement about the general concerning 
the role of women in society and that education is credited with creating a more 
accepting attitude about women’s employment.100 
Education for girls and women has been one of the strongest programs by 
many of these women’s groups.  Unlike Afghanistan, Iran has always had a 
strong tradition of education for girls.  But, after the revolution and the 
segregation of the schools, women’s groups placed a renewed effort into female 
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education.  Dr. Roksana Bahramitash argues, “To some extent it [education] has 
been the driving force behind women’s rising public role.”101  She cites that 
women make up 60% of the university graduates, many of whom leave their 
homes to study in the smaller cities because there is easier access to education.  
In addition, there has been a sharp increase in the number of women involved in 
‘women’s studies.’  Dr. Bahramitash also argues that this has had two effects, 
first that educated women are better able to stand on their own and think for 
themselves thus they are better equipped to defend their rights.  Second, she 
argues that just the mere presence of women, away form their families has had a 
moderating effect on the smaller cities in which they are studying.  There has 
been an accompanying transformation “of social values regarding the role of 
women in these smaller cities where new universities attract large numbers of 
single young women and where they reside in student housing.”102  So not only 
are women better educated, their mere presence in the public sphere has 
changed the perception of the rights and roles of women.   
The international community has also applied pressure to Iran on the 
basis of human rights, much of which is specifically women’s rights, or the lack 
thereof.  This is due in part to Iranian oppositional forces and feminists in exile.  
They use the international media to inform the world and expose the continued 
oppression of women under the Islamist regime of Iran.  International feminist 
organizations help to frame what is occurring in Iran as “Gender Apartheid”.  
Through the international media, they have been able to bring pressure on the 
Government of Iran to change their policies.   
The official promotion of a gender-apartheid society by a movement 
that has claimed to represent the oppressed, especially with 
compulsory veiling, and stories of stoning women and the like, offer 
tempting headlines to the European and North American media.103 
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4. Iran Analysis 
Iran is an important case study when examining the role of women and 
women’s organizations in MENA.  The Islamists policies towards women was the 
political opportunity that led to a large scale women’s movement operating for a 
common goal – to have their rights and freedoms returned to them.  These 
groups, working within the highly constrained and repressive environment of Iran 
have been able to mount an effective resistance to Islamism.  Their argument 
was framed as primarily as that of Muslim women seeking the promised Islamic 
justice.  Slogans such as, “It’s time for Ijtihad!” or questioning Islamic Justice as 
being just communicated their desire for fair treatment from a regime that was 
supposedly founded on the principles of Islamic justice.  These arguments 
resonated with the people of Iran and the mass pressure that resulted was 
successful in changing some of the repressive policies of the regime towards 
women. In addition to applying indirect pressure, women were successful in 
voting in Khatami who ran on a pro-women platform; so Iranian women have 
proven their power as a voting block when given a candidate that can represent 
their interests. 
Through Islamic feminism, women’s information campaigns, and 
education women’s organizations have been able to challenge the Islamist 
regime and have won some small victories in the battle over the woman 
question.  The education of girls and women was also used to resource women 
so that they could make an effective challenge to the Islamic regime.  The 
continued emphasis on education and the growing numbers of women with 
higher degrees is a promising trend that women will continue to confront the 
Islamist policies in an effort to regain freedoms that existed prior to the revolution 
and in effect reduce the impact and the spread of radical Islamist thought. The 
broken promises of the Islamists and the continued repression of Iranian 
women’s rights will continue to mobilize women in resisting the Islamists policies 
of the Iranian government.  These same women and women’s organizations 
could be valuable allies in the war of ideas. 
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C. ALGERIA  
1. Introduction 
Algeria provides an excellent case study on the role of Islamism and 
women due to women’s groups’ resisting to Islamist policies and laws, and the 
violence of groups such as the Islamic Salvation Front.  This chapter will provide 
a historical overview of Afghan women’s rights and the emergence of women’s 
organizations as the result of the Islamist passing the Family Code and the 
subsequent emergence of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS).  Women’s groups 
mobilized to face the threat posed by the Family Code and the Islamists on their 
rights and roles in Algerian society.  These organizations framed their arguments 
as a broken promise of the revolution and used the powerful images and names 
of Algerian women who became heroes for their leadership in resisting the 
French.  These women’s groups were instrumental in preventing the FIS and its 
splinter groups from gaining further popularity with the people.  In addition, 
Algerian women organizations were instrumental in the repeal of the Family 
Code.  Algeria is an important example of the power that women have when 
working in a concerted manner for a common objective. 
2. Historical Look at Algerian Women’s Rights  
Algerian women’s rights and their roles in Algerian society have 
experienced some changes throughout the last several centuries.  In 1830, 
France conquered Algeria, and France quickly dismantled much of the original 
society and declared Algeria “a full and integral part of France.”104  These 
policies had a deep and lasting effect on women in Algeria, which finally had an 
outlet during the Algerian war for independence in the 1950s.  The years after the 
war for independence also saw some changes.  The Family Code enacted in 
                                            
104 Aziz Enhaili and Oumelkheir Adda, “State and Islamism in the Maghreb,” Middle East 
Review of International Affairs Vol. 7, No. 1 (March 2003) found online at 
http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2003/issue1/jv7n1a6.html; accessed 13 November 2007.   
 46
1984 was the push that gave rise to the women’s movement in Algeria.  The 
opposition to this law gave new life to the women’s movement.  The 1990 civil 
war made the “woman question” a leading issue between the Islamists and the 
modernizers.  The historical core socio-cultural roles for women are based on 
Berber and Islamic traditional foundations, which are predominately patriarchal 
with strong Bedouin underpinnings, in which the separation of women and men 
outside of the home was a primary feature.105   
Women in Algeria, like many other countries in MENA, had a relative 
amount of freedom and mobility in the rural areas.  This was due in large part to 
the physical nature of the work that women did as a part of the rural family, and  
less intrusion by non-family members.  In urban areas, women were more 
secluded and often veiled.  French colonizing in the 1830s only strengthened this 
readily identifiable role of women inside Algerian society, which was a reaction 
against the French conquerors, and used as a means to protect women from the 
foreigners. 
The French worked to improve women’s positions in Algeria but had little 
success.  They launched educational, social, and economic programs particularly 
in the 1930s and 1940s, opening numerous schools.  This had little effect, 
however, because the “Muslim families remained unmoved; they kept their girls 
at home.”106    
The only identifiable success for the French, in regards to liberalizing 
social policies and cultural expressions for women, was in the capital city of 
Algiers, but this was mostly superficial.  By 1954 and the start of Algeria’s war of 
national liberation, 98% of women remained illiterate.107  
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During the revolution, the French redoubled their efforts to improve the 
standing of women in Algerian society using social, economic, and political 
reforms.  One specific example is that the number of girls in school nearly 
doubled in the area around Algiers from 1955 to 1959.  In addition, in 1958, 
women were given the right to vote for the first time in the history of Algeria.108  
But, in spite of these efforts, Algerian women fought the French for their country’s 
independence.   
During the revolution, women were able to move about in the public 
sphere and were seen by Algerian males as an important part of the revolution.  
In addition, “Veiled women participated in numerous anti-French marches and 
strikes” raising the level of women’s participation in the greater Algerian 
society.109 
Muslim women took an active role in the revolution as fighters, and by 
increasing their general presence in public as a means of silent protest against 
the French.  Some stopped wearing the veil because they were less likely to be 
stopped and searched by the French.  This enabled women to act as 
messengers and to carry supplies to the rebels.  One moudjahida (Algerian 
female fighter), who came to symbolize the role of the Muslim woman during the 
revolution, was Hassida Ben Bouali, who was killed in the battle of Algiers in 
1957, and has become a symbol for Algerian women.  The French tortured 
women who were part of the rebellion and two of these became heroes, Djamila 
Bouhired and Djamila Boupacha.   
“Algerian women played an important role in the struggle for 
independence as moudjahidates, but after the war they were expected to return 
to their domestic roles.”110  The movement of women from the seclusion of the 
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home and veil to the public sphere was short lived after the 1962 liberation of 
Algeria from France.  Dr. Alf Heggoy, a prominent historian who specialized in 
studying Algeria stated, “Unfortunately for Algerian women, the promises made in 
the heat of revolution were soon forgotten after independence.”111  Women 
expected to be emancipated as an indirect consequence of their participation in 
the struggle for independence, and hoped to maintain the freedoms that they had 
been able to express during the revolution.  David Gordon concludes in his book 
Women of Algeria: An Essay of Change, the revolution was fought in order “to 
bring into being a modern nation along socialists lines [and] to resurrect and 
restore culture… that was essentially Arabic and Islamic.”112  For women in 
Algeria this was not to be a reality.  Heggoy states that this was due, in part, to 
the fact that men were still interpreting the verses dealing with women in the 
Qur’an in a traditional manner.113   
3. Emergence of Women’s Groups and Feminist Organizations 
In the years after the revolution, women began to form women’s groups.  
The first such group was the Union Nationale des Femmes Algeriennes (UNFA).  
Formed in 1963, UNFA was the official body established by the government to 
address women’s concerns.  But the group was controlled by the Front de 
Liberation Nationale (FLN), the authoritarian regime that ruled Algeria, and did 
little other than act as a means of informing women about the actions of the FLN 
government.   
The political opportunity that brought women together to form 
organizations, and back out into the public sphere, was the attempt to draft and 
pass a Family Code.  There were multiple attempts starting in the 1960s and 
1970s that brought women out into the streets for demonstrations, but the real 
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pressure from the Islamists to pass the Family Code started in 1982.  The bill 
focused on the patriarchic structure of Algerian society, specifically addressing 
the role of women in the family.  
 The bill expressed the intent to preserve a dominant patrilineal 
familial structure and the subsidiary status of women within it.  The 
bill also introduced limits on women’s participation in the public 
arena by conditioning their right to work on husband’s permission – 
a provision nowhere to be found in the shari’a and its official 
schools of interpretation but abundantly manifested in Algerian 
customs of women’s effacement and dependence on male kin.114   
This attempt initially failed due to “the onslaught of conservatives, 
marches organized by women form professional circles, and the protests of a few 
war veterans concerned about the promulgation of such retrograde 
provisions.”115  One such group was organized in the city of Oran and conducted 
seminars to inform women and the public about the proposed legislation.  They 
also conducted street demonstrations led by former moudjahidates, drawing 
women from professional organizations, teachers, and students to participate.  
Failing to pass the code did not end the pressure from Islamists; it only increased 
it, and on 9 June 1982, the Qanun al-Usrah (Family Code) was passed.  “It 
established man’s dominance over women, legalized polygamy, men’s right to 
repudiate their wives, institutionalizing sexual inequality in inheritance, 
matrimonial guardianship and other fundamental discriminations.”116  With the 
exception of polygamy, the Family Code incorporated the rulings of Muslim legal 
scholars from the eighth through twelfth centuries.     
The passing of the Family Code was the political event that precipitated 
the growth of the feminist movement in Algeria.  The result was that women 
mobilized themselves into organizations to lobby for change and to protect 
themselves from the Islamists.  “In May 1985 the Association pour l’égalité 
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devant la loi entre les homes et les femmes (Egalite) brought together some 
thirty women’s organizations’’ working toward the amendment or abolishment of 
the Family Code.117  Central to their argument was that the Algerian laws and 
constitution guarantee equality or non-discrimination that directly contradicts the 
Family Code, therefore, the Family Code is unconstitutional.   
Women’s organizations received another boost in 1989, when the 
government amended the constitution as the result of the economic crisis and 
riots that occurred in the mid 1980s to 1988.  The amended constitution allowed 
for a multi-party parliamentary system and liberalized the laws governing other 
types of groups or associations.  The next years, over twenty new women’s 
organizations were founded, all focused on changing or removing the Family 
Code.  “Feminists protested the family code from the very beginning.  On March 
4, 1985, a group of women rallied in the Kasbah of Algiers on the site where 
Hassiba Ben Bouali had been killed.”118  The feminists were clearly evoking the 
memory of the revolution and the role that women played, in contrast to the new 
law. 
These women’s organizations each approached the problem in different 
ways.  Two of the most prominent forms of response were from the Islamic 
feminists and the liberal feminists.  Groups such as the Association pour la 
Défense et la promotion des droits de la femme and Association pour la 
promotion de la femme represented the Islamic feminist approach, and “they 
referred to a progressive reading of Islam to justify their demands.”119  
Groups such as Egalité, Voix des Femmes, and Tighri net mettout 
represented the liberal feminists.  These groups specifically focused on the 
abolishment of the Family Code and any other laws that discriminated against 
women.  They were vocal about demanding a “civil code which guarantees 
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sexual equality, bans polygamy, divorce, paternal guardianship, the equal rights 
in law of both parents and established the unconditional right of women to 
employment.”120  Both the Liberal feminist groups and the Islamic feminist groups 
conducted demonstrations, circulated petitions, and conducted lobbying in an 
effort to change the Family Code.   
In 1989, the various women’s groups throughout Algeria formed the 
National Women’s Coordination forum.  This forum established a minimum 
platform in calling for change.  Opposition to the Family Code was given top 
priority, as all of the groups saw it as being unconstitutional.  Other issues such 
as women’s right to work, voting for themselves instead of having a male 
guardian vote for them, and education rights were also agreed upon as being 
important issues for change.121 
The women’s groups that were formed used the history and idealism of 
the war of independence with France to frame their argument.  The images of the 
moudjahidates, have been a powerful symbol for the women of Algeria and as a 
means of framing the argument for women’s rights.  During demonstrations in 
1992 against the Family Code and violent actions of the Islamists, demonstrators 
raised signs and chanted: “Hassiba Ben Bouali, We Will Not Betray You” and 
Hassiba Ben Bouali, If You Could See Our Algeria.”122  These signs and chants 
clearly referred to one of the heroes of Algeria, and attempted to remind 
Algerians of the important role that women played in the fight for independence 
from France.  The Algeria in which they were living in was not the Algeria for 
which they had fought. 
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4. The Rise of the Islamists and Their Impact on Women in 
Algeria 
The constitutional changes of 1989, and the difficulties of the government, 
worked in favor of Islamists in Algeria.  Prior to the revolution, the Islamists were 
active in resisting French rule and emphasized the religious nature of resistance 
to the French and issued a call for Jihad to liberate Algiers as early as 1830.  
During the war for independence, Islamists were at the forefront of resistance 
with much of the rhetoric reflecting the Islamist influence.  This included 
characterizing resistance as Jihad and referring to those who were killed resisting 
the French as martyrs.  After being granted independence, the Islamists were 
very active in continuing to build support.   
The governing party, the FLN,  “squandered its popular support [from 
leading in the war for independence with France] by building a one-party socialist 
state that badly mismanaged Algeria’s deepening economic, social, and political 
problems.”123  The Islamists took advantage of this vacuum at the local level and 
established a network of social action outlets that met local needs and garnered 
them support using the Mosques and the Mullahs.124  In addition, “the regime 
attempted to shore up its position by co-opting the Islamist movement and 
solidifying its own Islamic credentials.”125  This allowed room for extremist views 
to be preached in the mosques and taught in the public school system, where 
Islamic religious education was mandated.  The passing of the Family Code was 
indicative of the influence of the Islamists and reflected the strengthening 
influence of the Islamists at the national level. 
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The 1989 amendment to the constitution, allowing a multi-party system, 
gave the Islamists room to rapidly build a political party using the pre-existing 
support structure.  This became the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) party, which 
was comprised of both moderate Muslims, as demonstrated in the leadership of 
Abbas Madani, and the more radical militant elements represented by Ali Belhaj 
as leaders for the FIS.  The FIS won 54% of the seats during the 1991 local 
elections.  The Islamists immediately started enacting policies such as mandating 
the veil on women employees, segregating offices, ordering people to remove 
their satellite dishes, and threatening to stop some cultural activities on the basis 
of being un-Islamic in the boroughs where they had gained control.126  In 
December 1991, the FIS won the first round of national elections and seemed 
poised to take a majority during the next parliamentary elections.  Faced with the 
threat of an Islamist victory, the army conducted a coup on 11 January 1992, 
removed President Benjedid, and canceled the elections. The army also 
instituted martial law and subsequently declared the FIS an illegal 
organization.127 
This act fomented the Algerian civil war and a period of violence between 
the Islamists and the rest of the country lasting from 1992–2003, which greatly 
impacted women and women’s organizations.  The FIS was pushed underground 
where it subsequently split with the more radical factions gaining strength.  These 
factions included the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), which was the military wing of 
the FIS., The Islamic Army Movement (MIA), and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), 
became the most violent and ruthless Islamic groups in the world.  The AIS 
focused most of its actions against the government, while the GIA waged a 
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culture war “to impose its vision of pure Islam on Algerian society by violently 
eliminating Western cultural influences that it considers a threat to that vision.”128 
The GIA , and to a lesser extent, the MIA, unleashed a terror campaign 
against women, slitting the throats of girls for not wearing the veil, raping women 
who were not accompanied by a male guardian, and assassinating working 
women, women not wearing the veil, and politically active women.129  In March of 
1994, the FIS/GIA issued a warning stating that any woman seen out on the 
streets without a veil would be killed and shortly thereafter two female students 
were killed while waiting at a bus stop.130  Later that same year, the GIA issued a 
warning forbidding women from riding on trains due to the mixing of men and 
women in the passenger compartments.  The GIA subsequently attacked and 
burned a train as further warning.  In 1997, the GIA “began to massacre whole 
villages, resulting in large numbers of casualties, disproportionately women and 
children.”131  Their policies specifically targeted women because they symbolized 
opposition to the Islamists.  “Any woman who is perceived as non-compliant was, 
and is still a target.”132   
5. Women Respond to the Islamists 
Women and women’s organizations resisted the demands and threats of 
the Islamists.  Following the 1991 elections and the local victories for the FIS, 
women took to the streets in marches and demonstrations organized by women’s 
groups to demonstrate against the FIS and the policies concerning women’s 
rights.  The signs referring to the moudjahidates, such as Ben Bouali who fought 
the French, frame women’s fight as continuing to fight oppression of the Islamists 
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just as they fought the oppression of the French.  Other signs read “Code de la 
Famille, Code de l’Infamie” (Family Code, Code of Infamy), Matvotich fi blasti (Do 
not vote for me/One Woman, One Vote) and still others chanted “Ya Benjedid, 
viens voir, les femmes sont dans la rue!  Qui sommes-nous? Les Filles de 
Hassiba! (O Bendjedid [the Algerian president in 1989], come and see, women 
are in the streets!  Who are we?  The daughters of Hassiba!)”133  The Coming of 
an Islamist State would be the negation of citizenship and Algerian identity.134  
Their simple slogans served to remind Algerians of what they fought for in the 
war of independence and to question whether that is the Algeria that they want to 
live in.   
Algerian Women’s groups won a victory in March 2005 when the Family 
code was reformed despite the objections from conservative groups such as the 
FLN and Islamists such as the Movement of the Society for Peace (MSP).  The 
commission’s president stated “that the proposed amendments are not attacks 
on the Shari’a but rather on the social customs that have been codified.”135   
Women’s opposition and public demonstrations were instrumental in the 
amendment of the Family Code as well as resisting the spread of Islamists ideas 
in the form of the FIS, GIA, and the MIA. 
6. Algeria Analysis 
Women and women’s organizations played an active part in defending the 
rights and freedoms of all Algerians against the oppressive and unwanted 
dictates of the Islamists, and serve as a reminder and as an example, that there 
exist ideals about being a Muslim other than just the Islamists’.  Women activist 
were instrumental in resisting the violence of Islamist groups during the Algerian 
Civil War and most importantly in changing the Algerian Family Code which 
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signal a change in the influence of the Islamists on the Algerian government.  In 
each instance, women mobilized and formed groups to maintain their rights and 
to defend them when threatened by Islamism.  By resisting and making their 
struggle a public referendum women were able to remind the Algerian public of 
the promises of the revolution.  They used the powerful imagery of the female 
fighter to remind Algerians of the Algeria they had fought for.  In addition, the 
women’s groups used the Islamists own violence against women to ask if this 
was the Algeria that the people wanted.  These simple appeals resonated with 
the Algerian people and helped to reduce the popularity of the Islamist groups 
and have also been successful in repealing the Family Code that was enacted by 
the Islamists.  The Algerian women’s resistance to Islamism is evidence that 
women can be an important part resisting the spread and influence of Islamism. 
D. AFGHANISTAN  
1. Afghanistan Introduction 
Afghanistan has clearly been the most affected country in the world by the 
rise of Islamism in the form of the Taliban, in regards to women.  Afghanistan as 
a case study is important because data exists that demonstrates the progression 
of women’s place in Afghan society in the years preceding the Taliban and what 
the subsequent imposition of Islamists policies had on women.  Since the fall of 
the Taliban in 2001, evidence also exists that demonstrates women’s role and 
women’s groups’ role in rebuilding Afghanistan.  This section will demonstrate 
that women and women’s groups mobilized to resist the Taliban and since the 
removal of the Taliban regime have worked to regain their rights.  The women of 
Afghanistan also model the extreme impact Islamism can have.  It is this model 
that is of value to other Muslim women in informing them of what the impact 
could be if Islamism is not resisted. 
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2. Women’s Rights in the Years Preceding the Soviet Invasion 
Women’s place in Afghan society experienced many gains and losses in 
the years preceding the Taliban regime.  In traditional Afghan society, women 
have held an inferior position legally and economically as in most Islamic 
countries.  Under Shari’a law, a daughter receives half the inheritance that a son 
receives.  In addition, a women’s economic independence was traditionally 
restricted in that women were not allowed to work outside of the home and had 
little to no access to their dowry or bride price which was controlled by the 
husband or father.  Legally, women had very little standing under the law.  In 
court, a women’s testimony only counts as half that of a man’s.  Women were 
greatly hindered in accessing any legal help due to the high rates of illiteracy as 
well as their ability to move outside of their homes without being accompanied by 
a close male relative.  The ability for a woman to divorce a man or to gain 
custody of children was also another area of inequality. 
In the Pashtun areas, a women’s virtue was a critical part of the family and 
clan honor.  Women were the carriers of a man’s honor.  Inside of the home, 
women had a great deal of influence but very little influence outside of the 
home.136  The Pashtun patriarchal structures are very strict and varied from 
commonly accepted Islamic law as practiced in most other Muslim countries.  
These strict tribal codes have also had their effect on other tribes in the 
Afghanistan area especially in regards to marriage because of the importance of 
bride price and any land that may be associated with the price.137  The Pashtun 
also comprise over half the population of Afghanistan, which makes their 
customs of even greater impact on their neighboring tribes.  Under Pashtunwali 
(Pashtun customary Law), women are not allowed divorce or allowed to own 
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land.138  Women are also tied closely with or honor codes.  “Women were the 
bearers of the family honor, and a man’s reputation was measured through the 
behavior of the females in his household.”139  Men protected their honor by 
preventing women from ever being in a situation where they could violate that 
honor.  This severe interpretation of seclusion “is customarily justified by invoking 
Quranic prescription and by the notion that women are basically licentious and 
tempt men.”140  
The twentieth century saw some gains for women’s rights in Afghanistan 
but these were mostly top down efforts by the ruling elite.  Between 1901–1919, 
Amir Habibullah Khan, enacted several reforms in education, marriage, and 
attempted to stop mandatory veiling with a guiding principle that women were a 
contributing part of society not just mothers.141  He also decreed, “Men were 
entitled to full control of their women.”142  The next ruler of Afghanistan, King 
Amanullah (1919–1929), attempted to modernize Afghanistan and women’s 
rights were a major part of his reforms.  King Amanullah abolished the veil and 
seclusion as law “in the 1923-24 code Nizamnamah-ye arusi, nijah wa 
khatnauri.”143 
Nader Shah (1929–1933) reversed these gains.  He reinstituted both the 
veil and seclusion.  This was a temporary setback in the modernization of 
women’s rights.  The next ruler, Zahir Shah (1933–1973) enacted several 
modernization programs to improved women’s rights in Afghanistan.  It was 
during this period that gender relations once again improved women’s place in 
Afghan society.  These changes gained momentum under the leftist regime of 
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Mohammed Daoud (1973–1978).  The veil was optional again, Kabul University 
opened to women, and women were allowed to work in government offices and 
were able to run for public office.144  “In 1977, they [women] comprised over 15% 
of Afghanistan’s highest legislative body.  It is estimated that by early 1990s, 
70% of school teachers, 50% of government workers, and 40% of doctors in 
Kabul were women.”145  Of critical importance is to note that most of these gains 
were only realized in urban areas and were never fully implemented in the rural, 
tribal areas, which were still governed by more traditional tribal laws and 
customs.   
3. Women during the Soviet Occupation 
A pivotal moment for Afghanistan took place in 1979 with the invasion by 
the Soviet Union.  1979 was also a monumental year for Islamists with the 
Iranian revolution that gave new hope and power to Islamist movements.  The 
Soviet invasion polarized Afghanistan and women’s place in Afghan society more 
then ever.  Some Afghan women benefited under the communist state with the 
backing of the Soviet Union.  These were primarily isolated to the major cities 
where the Soviets enjoyed relatively more control and stability.  Women were 
free to go to school (Kabul University had a female majority student population 
under the Communists), held positions in the government, held positions in all 
the professional sectors (doctors and teachers), and were not required to wear 
the veil.146   
The Communist Afghan regime introduced laws to raise the 
minimum age at marriage for girls to sixteen years, put limits on the 
traditional ‘bride price’ system, and allegedly forced women to 
participate in literacy programs.  The Communist regime’s  
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modernization reforms to improve the status of women, was once 
again, unacceptable to segments of the predominantly Muslim 
population.147   
These differences were at the heart of the resistance movement and 
become one of the most visible policy differences and a way to differentiate them 
from what they saw as the corrupting influence of the Soviets.   
As much as the Soviets attempted to improve women’s status, the 
presence of the Soviets marked the decline of women’s rights in Afghanistan.  
“Women’s status and control over women’s behavior became symbols of the 
differences between the Communist governments and their mujahideen 
opponents.”148  The Soviet invasion and their subsequent policies, led to the 
Jihad (lesser Jihad) in which the Mujahideen vowed to remove the invaders from 
their soil.  “Afghan women played virtually no part in the jihad.  They were, 
however, conspicuous on the pro-Soviet side, with four out of the seven militia 
commanders appointed to the communist Revolutionary Council being 
women.”149 
The constant fighting displaced a large percentage of the population to 
refugee camps due to war as well as a drought that affected Afghanistan during 
this period.  These refugee camps  
became a fertile ground for the new Islamist ideology of many of 
the mujahideen groups, which in combination with the dramatically 
different living conditions than traditional Afghan villages, curtailed 
women’s freedom of movement and led to a retreat once again to 
the veil.  The camps also bred a new generation of Afghan fighters, 
who came of age in a drastically altered society, where women’s 
status and control over women’s behavior and activities became 
symbols of the differences between the Communist governments 
and their mujahideen opponents.150   
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4. Women during the Taliban Regime 
The Soviets withdrew in 1989, leaving Afghanistan in a civil war with the 
different mujahideen leaders and warlords fighting for power.  It was during this 
time that the Taliban began its rise to power in Afghanistan.  The Taliban began 
in the Pashtun tribal regions in 1994, led by Mullah Mohammed Omar gaining 
power in 1996 and “established an Islamic fundamentalist regime under Sharia 
law.”151  The Taliban “have made the issue of women’s roles and status a 
cornerstone of their Islamization programme.  Indeed, the policies toward women 
and girls, in conjunction with the law and order policies, in many ways constitute 
the centerpiece of Taliban public policy.”152  Goodson goes on to say that, it was 
this displacement during the Soviet occupation that led to the perversion of the 
normal family and village system.  It was in this environment “that many young 
boys failed to learn the traditional balance that existed among rural Afghans in 
their attitudes toward women – that women were to be controlled and 
respected.”153  The latter — respect — became an obvious problem as the 
Taliban gained more and more control of Afghanistan.  In fact, the Taliban did not 
have any other policies that were as readily evident as their policies towards 
women.  In Fundamentalism Reborn?  Afghanistan and the Taliban, William 
Maley, puts forward the idea that the Taliban leaders actually feared women 
were a corrupting influence on their young teenage followers and saw them as a 
challenge to their leadership and legitimacy.154   
It is important to note, however, that not all women in Afghanistan were 
against the Taliban or other likeminded mujahideen groups.  There are cases in 
which women are portrayed as heroines for “exemplifying Afghan values, Islamic 
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virtue, family honor, and refusal to accept Communist dress code ideas.”155  One 
of these heroines was Nahida, who led schoolgirls and teachers in 
demonstrations against the Communist in Kabul in 1980–81.156  Another of these 
female heroines is Tajwar Kakar.  She set up a covert school to train boys as 
mujahideen fighters in Kunduz.157  Malalai, a figure form Afghan history, was 
another example for the Taliban and the women of Afghanistan.  Malalai fought 
in a battle against the British in 1880 and achieved a heroine’s status.  All of 
these women were used as an example of what the Taliban considered 
acceptable during war against an outsider.  But this contrast sharply with the 
Taliban’s policies once they were in control of a region. 
Goodson, in his article “Perverting Islam: Taliban Social Policy Towards 
Women,” identifies six major areas of the Taliban’s policies regarding women.  
These are women’s rights to appear in public, women’s rights to work, girls’ rights 
to education, women’s rights to adequate health care, women’s rights in personal 
dress, and women’s rights before the law.158  The Taliban policies towards 
women had a devastating effect not on just the women of Afghanistan but also 
on the country as a whole.   
The Taliban’s policy about women appearing in public, effected women 
who had already suffered the most during the decades of conflict and were the 
most at risk, the widows.  “On 28 September 1996, Radio Kabul (Radio Shari’ah) 
announced, ‘as per an order issued by the Amir al-mu’minin (the commander of 
the faithful), Mullah Mohammed Omar, women were not allowed to venture 
outside of their homes’.”159  Women were now required to be accompanied by a 
legally acceptable escort such as a close male family member.  This is in keeping 
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with Pashtun tribal traditions but Islamic law does not require it.160  Prior to the 
long period of conflict, this type of decree would not have had much of an impact, 
but in the war torn country, this policy had devastating effects. 
When the Taliban took control of Kabul, there were approximately 7,900 
registered widows.  By the time the Taliban had consolidated their power over 
most of Afghanistan, this number had risen to approximately 17,700 widows with 
children in the 16 districts around Kabul.161  These women were forced to rely on 
others who, more often then not, were not much better off then themselves.  
Women who were force to rely on themselves often faced punishment for simply 
trying to get something to eat because they had to violate the Taliban’s edicts on 
women being in public without an escort.  The United States Department of State 
(DOS) reports that the Taliban had one of the worlds worst human rights records.  
The DOS points out that the Taliban “has perpetrated egregious acts of violence 
against women, including rape, abduction, and forced marriage.”162  The report 
goes on to estimate that by 2001, there were approximately 50,000 widows who 
“have been forced to sell all of their possessions and beg in the streets, or worse, 
to provide for themselves and their families.”163  This is in direct opposition to the 
Taliban’s own stated purpose for their campaign in 1994 to capture Kandahar.  
They justified their attack by saying they were fighting to eliminate the local 
warlord and soldiers who were preying on women and young boys for their 
pleasure.164  The Taliban regime did little to assist these widows.  The Taliban’s 
repressive laws such as seclusion only made it more difficult for these women to 
meet even the most basic of their needs.   
The Taliban’s policies concerning girls and education were among the 
most contentious.  Their policies had two effects.  The first was by preventing 
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women from working, they dramatically cut the number of teachers (women were 
approximately 70% of the teachers).  This policy kept women and girls repressed 
and illiterate making it all but impossible to contribute to the well being of their 
families.  Prior to the Taliban taking control, education for both boys and girls was 
valued both by the rural Afghans as well as the urban Afghans.   The Taliban 
eventually started to ease this regulation when confronted with Qur’anic evidence 
from religious scholars but they still limited education for girl only allowing the 
study of the Qur’an up to the age of eight.165   
Taliban restrictions for women and health care had a devastating effect.  
The Taliban forbade male doctors from seeing or touching a female and female 
doctors were not allowed to work.  The over all impact was a dramatic drop in the 
life expectancy of women.  The life expectancy for a woman under the Taliban 
regime was 43–44 years, twenty years less then that of a developing country.166  
Infant mortality rates were also another dramatic symbol of the Taliban’s policy.  
Infant mortality was the highest in the world with 163 per 1,000.167 
The Taliban also took seclusion and dress codes very seriously.  They 
imposed the burqa, and enforced it with threats, fines, and beatings.  The Taliban 
required that houses with women paint their windows black to prevent them from 
inadvertently being seen.  Nageeba, a 35-year-old widow in Kabul stated, “The 
life of Afghan women is so bad.  We are locked at home and cannot see the 
sun.”168   
The Taliban justified its policies by saying they were attempting to “ensure 
a society in which women had a safe and dignified role”169 but the exact opposite 
was the case.  The numbers tell part of the truth to the world but most telling are 
the statements of the Afghan women themselves.  Dr. Minakshi Das’s study, 
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“Taliban’s War on Women,” focused on interviewing Afghan refugees.  Here are 
a few of the statements from some of the women she interviewed. 
• In Afghanistan people are hanged for no fault.  There are no rules 
for humanity.  Only the name Afghanistan remains, it is no longer 
what it was.170 
• God has made me so beautiful that he forgot to give me good 
fortune …My nation thought my body belonged to it…We women 
have become properties of the state.  We are objects to be used 
and then discarded…A women’s body becomes the site of conflict, 
whereby she is forced to leave her country.171 
• Because of the Taliban, Afghanistan has become a jail for women.  
We haven’t got any human rights.  We haven’t the right to go 
outside, to go to work, to look after our children.  – Faranos Nazir, 
34 year old women in Kabul.172 
 
Goodson points out that the Taliban justified every edict in terms of Islam.   
For the Taliban anyone questioning these edicts, which have no 
validity in the Koran, is tantamount to questioning Islam itself, even 
though the Prophet Mohammed’s first task was to emancipate 
women…[The Taliban believed they] were right, their interpretation 
of Islam was right and everything else was wrong…173   
Most of the Muslim world, decried the Taliban’s policies towards women 
though, as being un-Islamic and only Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the United 
Arab Emirates gave diplomatic recognition to the Taliban 
The Taliban also received support from Jihadists who extolled the Taliban 
as the model for what an Islamic State should be.  “Bin Laden repeatedly argued 
that Afghanistan had become a model Islamic state under his Taliban hosts and 
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used religious rhetoric to solicit support for the Taliban and Al Qaeda.”174  Ayman 
Zawahiri praised the Mujahideen and described them as being “Murabit lions of 
Islam in Afghanistan who are aiding the religion of the Prophet, peace be upon 
him, in the face of the alliance of Crusaders and apostates.”175     
It is easy for an outsider, especially a westerner to say these policies are 
wrong or unacceptable but this does not carry much weight due to cultural 
sensitivity and knowledge of Islam.  The real measure of the legitimacy of the 
Taliban’s Islamic State was the people who were affected — the women of 
Afghanistan.  The numbers of women who fled the regime and the statements 
and actions of these women is proof that this type of Islamization or creation of 
an Islamic State is not what they want for themselves, their families, or their 
country.   
5. The Beginning of Afghan Women’s Organizations 
It was the Diaspora of women from Afghanistan that led to the initial 
development of women’s organizations for Afghanistan during the civil war that 
followed the Soviet withdrawal and the subsequent emergence of the Taliban.  
The brutal repression of the Taliban in essence gave women the political 
opportunity to form these organizations.  Mobilization of women’s groups took 
two forms, one internal and the other from international assistance.  Internally, 
covert groups formed out of necessity, and women who fled the country to 
refugee camps were able to form groups and receive aid form NGOs, many of 
which were women’s aid organizations.  Women’s contact with each other in the 
refugee camps and their exposure to NGOs assisted the Afghan women to begin 
mobilizing groups and organizations themselves.  Many of the women who 
remained formed groups in secret to meet some of the needs that the Taliban 
were denying such as education and health care.  Additionally, women formed 
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cooperatives as a means of meeting strict Taliban dress codes and mobility 
restrictions through the sharing of clothes since the required burqa was often too 
expensive for every woman to have one.176   
The covert home schools for girls during the Taliban period, and the 
refugee support projects organized and run by educated Afghan 
women exiled in Pakistan, have served as training grounds for the 
women activists now designing and managing new programs in and 
out of government.177   
One of these groups is RAWA, the Revolutionary Association of the 
Women of Afghanistan, formed in 1997 as a means of continuing education for 
girls and some health care.178  Internal to the country, groups such as RAWA 
remained covert to avoid punishment by the Taliban, but outside of the country, 
they lobbied Western nations heavily framing their argument as “Gender 
Apartheid,” working to raise awareness of what was occurring to women inside of 
Afghanistan at the hands of the Taliban.  The image of an Afghan women gazing 
from behind a veil became a powerful image in the West.   
Other groups that were very active during the Taliban period were the 
Afghan Women’s Council, the Afghan Women Social and Cultural Organization, 
the Afghan Women Welfare Development, the Afghan Women’s Education 
Center, the Afghan Women’s Network, and the Women’s Association for Peace 
and Human Rights in Afghanistan (WAPHA).  Most of these groups were formed 
to assist women in refugee camps providing healthcare, counseling, education, 
and job training.   
Afghan civil society and community-based activists are working 
hard to begin reconstructing their society in refugee camps, in 
preparation for the day when they can reclaim and rebuild their own 
country.  Women have played an important role in these efforts, 
both in refugee settlements and—clandestinely—in communities in 
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Afghanistan.  These women and men says, Sima Wali, an Afghan 
women who directs the non-profit organization Refugee Women in 
Development, ‘have already demonstrated remarkable leadership 
and ability.  They are our hope for Afghanistan.179   
The international feminist group Women Living Under Muslim Laws 
(WLUML) also issued numerous reports on the plight of women in Afghanistan.  
 The transnational feminist campaign in support of women’s rights 
in Afghanistan succeeded in preventing all but three countries from 
extending diplomatic recognition to the Taliban regime (Saudi 
Arabia, Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates)…All this pointed to 
the emergence of a new international environment, including the 
influence of global feminism.180 
6. Post Taliban Period and Women’s Groups 
Following the U.S. led invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent defeat 
of the Taliban in 2001, these women’s organizations continued their work with 
and on behalf of Afghan women, but now were able to work inside Afghanistan.  
New organizations were also created, such as the New Afghanistan Women 
Association (NAWA), whose primary stated mission is education; the Training 
Human Rights Association for Afghanistan, which strives to teach women 
handicrafts and promotes women’s rights; and the World Organization for Mutual 
Afghan Network, primarily focused on teaching widows to read.  Almost all of 
these women’s organizations are based in Kabul due to continued security risks 
and continued instability in parts of the country.   
These women’s groups were limited, however, in their ability to mobilize 
resources internally to any significant level due to continued security problems 
which continue to be a major threat.   
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While the de jur discrimination imposed by the Taliban has ended in 
many places, life for too many women and girls in Afghanistan 
remains subject to de facto restrictions.  “We couldn’t go out during 
the Taliban,” another woman in rural Paghman said.  “Now we are 
free and we can go out but we don’t.”181   
The current state of women’s rights is similar to that of earlier 
improvements; only in the Kabul area and other urbanized pockets is there any 
real improvement.  Much of the rural areas remain unchanged due to the 
continued threat of violence as well as the strict adherence to Pashtunwali tribal 
codes. 
“Attacks against non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and their staff 
by armed groups have resulted in humanitarian agencies scaling back their 
projects or operating in fewer districts, most notably in the south.”182  This in 
particular has had an effect on women’s organizations attempt to work in areas 
other than Kabul.  2006 may well be the most violent year since the 2001 
invasion. 
In addition, the limited number of educated women in the country has had 
a measurable effect on the numbers of women involved.  This has also dictated 
the focus of many of the international women’s organizations efforts.  Most of the 
work is at the basic subsistence level programs and at education programs to 
expand girl’s access to education.  Education programs have expanded with 
approximately 1.73 million girls attending school in grades 1–6, as reported by 
the Afghan Ministry of Education in December 2006, which is 500% increase 
from December 2001.183  But, security continues to be a concern as the Taliban 
continue to threaten women and girls education through threats and violence.   
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The UN reported in 2006 that 359 schools had been closed due to intimidation of 
teachers, students, and parents; an additional 183 schools were burnt in arson 
attacks.184 
Another issue was that change was not mandated and enforced quickly 
enough and that the women that were prepared to take leadership roles on 
behalf of women were discouraged or were unable to because of the lack of 
progress and security concerns.  Some Afghan women viewed this as a broken 
promise.  Colin Powell, then Secretary of State, declared in November 2001 “the 
recovery of Afghanistan must entail a restoration of the rights of Afghan 
women…”185  But this contrasted sharply with the reality of a post Taliban 
Afghanistan.  
Although the Interim Administration has publicly endorsed the right 
of women to obtain an education and employment, the lack of an 
official repeal of Taliban edicts by the Justice ministry is a 
significant concern for many women Human Rights Watch 
interviewed.186   
A recent report from RAND, Center for Middle East Public Policy, has 
found in a study on post-conflict development in Afghanistan that “the inclusion of 
women earlier in the process brings more security, not less” and including 
women as a part of reconstruction activities improves the outcome of post-
conflict nation-building.187  
The liberal feminist agenda has had more success at the national level, 
but again, little progress has been made in the more rural areas of Afghanistan.  
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In 2004, the constitution was ratified.  It attempted to balance traditional Islamic 
values with individual rights.  International women’s rights groups and Afghan 
women’s groups heavily lobbied this process.   
Women had become legally free to work and study after being 
forcibly home-bound under the Taliban, and had been guaranteed a 
role in public life through seat quotas in the national and provincial 
legislatures.188   
Today, women are involved in the legislative process and are at work 
promoting a reformist agenda.  Women activists such as Malalai Joya, a 
representative elected in 2005 to parliament, has been so vocal about the issue 
of women’s rights that the Afghan parliament voted to suspend Joya from her 
seat on the grounds of criticizing other members of Parliament.  
Islamic feminist are working towards a better understanding of the issue of 
seclusion and veiling in regards to Islam and tribal customs but, again, success 
has only been seen in urban areas while the rural tribal areas are still mainly 
influenced by Pashtun tribal customs.  The lack of access and the continuing 
violence, as well as the high illiteracy rate, has made the Islamic feminist 
approach ineffective in Afghanistan.   
At the local level, women and women’s organizations or NGOs are 
involved, but to a much lower degree.  One of the main issues is that the women 
who are filling the mandated positions on the local village shuras are just puppets 
of their husbands or other influential men on the council and are not representing 
women or women’s rights.189  Education, tribal customs, and the threat of 
violence are cited as the reasons for women’s inability to assert their views 
independently.  Afghanistan has also ratified the United Nations Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women treaty.  The 
continuing issue remains that at the national level, Afghan laws may guarantee a 
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woman’s rights but at the local level and at the personal level, these laws have 
had little effect in improving women’s rights.  It is at the local level that the 
women’s movement will have to make changes to see these laws actually put 
into practice. 
7. Afghanistan Analysis 
The Women’s movement in Afghanistan faces numerous challenges, 
namely security and entrenched tribal customs being two of the strongest issues 
that women face in Afghanistan.  Afghan civil society was also extremely 
damaged due to decades of fighting.  It is the rebuilding of Afghanistan’s civil 
society that must be the initial focus and women must be a part of the process to 
ensure their place in the future of Afghanistan.   
Security is the next major issue.  Security must come as the result of the 
development of an effective government that can enforce the laws in a just 
manner throughout the country.  U.S. and NATO forces continue to fight the 
resurgent Taliban in the south and along the Pakistan border region as well as 
training the Afghan Army and Police.  “Improving Afghan women’s physical 
security is critical.  ‘When women are afraid to go out in the street, they can’t take 
advantage of the theoretical freedoms that are now available to them.’”190   
Both Liberal feminists and Islamic feminists are working to improve 
women’s rights.  Liberal feminist are working at the national level to insure that 
the laws guarantee the individual rights of women.  Areas of concern continue to 
be family law such as divorce, marriage, and child custody.  Islamic feminist 
groups are working on these same issues by expanding on the strict 
interpretation of Quranic passages by presenting alternative interpretations that 
are less restrictive to women and more clearly define what is Islamic and what is 
tribal.  However, both of these efforts are severely restricted due to security, 
illiteracy, and Pashtun tribal dominance. 
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Education efforts on behalf of girls are critical in developing women who 
are capable of being an active part of Afghan society.  This must include a 
continued focus on developing primary school education and expanding 
education beyond primary school for girls.  This is an area that NGOs and the 
United States can assist by continuing the development of schools, training 
teachers, and by providing scholarships for continuing education for deserving 
Afghan women.  Some areas of study should include education, law, religion and 
theology, economics and finance, political science, and other areas of study that 
would continue to develop Afghan women in order to take leadership positions 
within their country and to assist in the development of Afghan society. 
Afghanistan demonstrates that women and women’s groups mobilized to 
face the extreme repression of the Taliban and were able to maintain 
organizations that have helped in rebuilding Afghanistan after the removal of the 
Taliban.  Women and women’s organizations will continue to play an important 
role in equipping women to be a part of Afghan society. 
E. CASE STUDIES CONCLUSION 
The role of women is of critical importance in the fight against radical 
Islamist ideology as examined in these three case studies.  The Islamist’s 
interpretation of an Islamic state would most likely be extremely repressive as 
seen in Iran and Afghanistan.  Algeria, Afghanistan, and Iran witnessed a century 
of improvements to the rights of women that were reversed in a short period of 
time.  The Taliban regime is a model of the impact of Islamism.  Iran, though not 
as extreme, is a model of what Islamic fundamentalist ideology might look like if it 
were to come to fruition elsewhere.  The real significance of these cases is the 
continued resistance of the women of Algeria, Afghanistan, and Iran to Islamist 
policies, laws, and ideology.  Women mobilized groups and organizations to 
challenge Islamist ideology in an effort to maintain or regain their rights.  This is 
not just the construct of outsiders or westerners, but of Muslim women  
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themselves and the struggle for their rights inside of those societies.  It is this 
struggle, at the political, societal, and personal level, that has application in the 
fight against Islamist ideology and the war of ideas. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMATION 
This thesis has examined Muslim women and women’s groups to 
determine if they could be a critical vulnerability in Islamist ideology and an asset 
to the United States in the Global War on Terror.  The case studies of Iran, 
Algeria, and Afghanistan have demonstrated that women have mobilized as a 
result of broken promises by Islamists and their repressive policies.  Women 
have challenged Islamism using different approaches and have had some 
measurable results in reversing gains made by the Islamists.  Women’s groups’ 
efforts have improved women’s overall place in their respective societies, but 
much work remains.   
Women and women’s organizations are an important ally in the war of 
ideas in resisting the influence and spread of Islamism.  Islamism by its very 
nature and definition seeks to limit the rights and roles that women can play in a 
Muslim society.  Under Islamists, women are viewed in a symbolic manner and 
are secluded from others via veiling, seclusion, and other limits that prevent 
women from entering the public sphere. Women in Iran, Algeria, and Afghanistan 
have mobilized against these policies. The plight of women in these countries 
and their struggle to regain their rights may be useful in understanding what 
would happen if current Jihadist organizations such as al Qaeda, Hezbollah, 
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria, or the Taliban (in Afghanistan again) 
were successful in the creation of their vision of an Islamic States.  For this very 
reason, the United States should endeavor to engage and work with women and 
women’s organizations to strengthen this natural resistance to the repressive 
ideology of Islamism. 
Feminism, specifically Liberal and Islamic feminism, seek to broaden 
Islamism’s restrictive understanding of women’s roles in society.  Islamic 
feminism attempts to strip away centuries of male dominated interpretations and 
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overly patriarchal cultural practices, and to read Quran and Hadith in a more 
progressive historical and linguistic fashion.  From this broader understanding 
comes a new understanding of the women in Muslim cultures and how Muslim 
women can be an active part of civil society.  Liberal feminism builds on this 
understanding and seeks to amend, repeal, or write new laws that guarantee the 
rights and equality of women.  These ideas and methods directly confront 
Islamism by offering a competing view of women in Islam and by exposing the 
broken promises and brutality committed by the Islamists in regard to women.   
Iran, Algeria, and Afghanistan provide three different models of how 
women and women’s groups have mobilized and the actions they have taken 
when threatened by Islamism.  In Iran, women and women’s groups have been a 
dynamic force in resisting the policies of the Iranian regime and working towards 
a broader understanding through Islamic fundamentalism.  These women’s 
groups waged a public information campaign focusing on the broken promises of 
the Khomeini regime to inform the Iranian public of the impact that the regimes’ 
legislation and policies were having on women.  This created a groundswell of 
discontent and created pressure on the government that was forced to repeal or 
amend several policies that were directly having a negative affect on women.  By 
insisting that they maintain their place in the public sphere, women have been 
able to create a gradual change of perceptions that women are a part of society, 
as shown in Iran, and women have been able to regain many of the jobs and 
positions that the Khomeini regime declared as un-Islamic.  Iranian women’s 
organizations have been fighting to regain women’s freedoms and rights for 28 
years and have had some success such as the amendment to the Family Laws, 
the reinstatement of women judges, and child custody, but the Islamists policies 
of the Iranian regime have limited women’s ability to enter the public sphere and 
have reacted violently when challenged.    
Algeria provides another example of women mobilizing to challenge the 
Islamist ideology.  Women’s groups in Algeria focused on the broken promises 
made during the war for independence and formed numerous organizations to 
 77
challenge the loss of women’s rights due to the Islamist passing of the Family 
Code.  These women’s organizations were also valuable in resisting the violence 
of Islamist groups such as the GIA during the Algerian Civil War.  Women 
continued to fight for a repeal of the Family Code and were successful with the 
parliament voting to amend the law improving women’s place in Algerian society.  
This also signaled a reduction in the influence the Islamists had, in which 
women’s groups played a significant role by informing the public of the violence 
the Islamists committed against women.  Women’s activist groups in Algeria are 
further proof that women are a vital part in resisting Islamism. 
Afghanistan is a poignant example of the repressive nature of Islamism.  
Even under these circumstances women organized groups in an effort to hold 
onto the most basic of rights.  The work done by women’s organizations outside 
of Afghanistan was also important in raising worldwide awareness of what was 
occurring in Afghanistan.  Since the fall of the Taliban, women’s place in Afghan 
society has improved with the passing of a constitution that guarantees their 
rights, but much work remains.  Women’s groups in Afghanistan are still limited in 
their efforts due to security problems, women’s limited education and literacy, 
and Pashtun tribal customs.  However, women are active in working for change 
in many ways.  Education, raising security issues, and working for a better 
understanding between Islam and culture has helped to improve women’s 
situations in Afghanistan.  The United States can further its own battle against 
Islamism by working with women’s groups such as the ones in Iran, Algeria, and 
Afghanistan, thus opening another front in the war of ideas against Islamism by 
working indirectly in support of these organizations and openly via foreign policy. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Women and women’s organizations can be vital allies in the war of ideas 
against Islamism.  The United States must develop a program of engagement 
and support to assist women and women’s organizations that are living under 
Islamist rule or those who are threatened by its ideology in the broader Muslim 
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world.  There are two primary means that the U.S. can assist these women’s 
organizations and multiple supporting methods: direct engagement and indirect 
engagement.   
The U.S. Government should give priority to working with these groups 
through indirect methods for numerous reasons.  To reach women in Muslim 
countries, the U.S. must work with other organizations such as NGOs, and in 
particular, NGOs focused on women’s issues.  By supporting NGOs, the United 
States can gain access to places where NGOs are already at work and can 
expand the impact these organizations could have.  There are three problems 
that must be addressed when working with organizations outside of the U.S. 
government.  First, the organization may have other programs or policies that are 
not in keeping with U.S. interests or values.  The U.S. must thoroughly 
understand the mission, objectives and underlying ideology of any group that the 
U.S. may work with.  This is important in preventing an act or a belief from being 
transmitted by extension back to the U.S., which may be harmful or counter to 
U.S. policy objectives and values.  
Second and more significant is that by working with the U.S., a group’s 
credibility could be jeopardized, or as some analysts have commented, be given 
the kiss of death — a complete loss of credibility because of their collusion with 
the U.S..  In recent years, many Muslims are under the belief that the U.S. is 
hostile to Islam and trying to use women as a cultural invasion.  The U.S. must 
avoid this perception and attempt to limit its impact on groups who partner with 
the U.S. in order to work with Muslim women and be effective.  Furthermore, 
many NGOs are openly hostile to the U.S. and will not work with the U.S., no 
matter what the issue.  This is particularly true with women’s organizations that 
have a negative view of the United States’ foreign policies.  
These problems leave little room for the United States to openly conduct a 
strategy of engagement with women and women’s organizations.  This leaves 
the U.S. the option of working indirectly with these groups.  Due to the open 
hostility of some NGOs and the potential harm to either the U.S.’s image or the 
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organizations image, the U.S. should work in an indirect or un-attributable 
manner.  These programs would not be run by U.S. agencies and would not have 
the U.S. brand anywhere on them.  This entails the U.S. working through willing 
partners who are then is able to transfer those assets to NGOs and other 
organizations that are working to address the woman question in the Muslim 
world.  This does not mean keeping it secret, but does infer that the U.S. is not 
directly conducting the program.  Some of these partners could be other 
countries who share a similar view and have similar policies to the U.S. but have 
a better relationship with a particular country.  Others could be existing 
international aid organizations, or regional, national, and local organizations that 
are on good terms with the United Sates and share a common vision in wanting 
to assist women in the Muslim world.  These organizations then could develop 
and run programs such as education (to include scholarship programs), legal 
assistance, job training, humanitarian crisis, and many more. 
Some of the principal areas where work is already being conducted by 
women-focused NGOs include women’s education, legal assistance and 
representation, and financial programs such as micro loans, job and skill training, 
medical assistance, and many more.  With the U.S. helping to support these 
efforts in an indirect manner, these organizations would then be better able to 
conduct broader initiatives and be able to implement longer-term programs.  In 
addition to just funding, the U.S. could provide training to others who would then 
be able to offer training to these NGOs.  Some areas that may be applicable 
include legal representation or just raising the awareness of women’s legal rights.  
This could be done using many different formats such as newspaper articles and 
radio shows, or even television shows that are either informative or entertaining 
depicting real scenarios in a manner that raises awareness of women’s rights 
and some strategies they could implement themselves.  One serious drawback to 
working through other organizations is the ability to control or guide the efforts.  
Additionally, corruption is another problem that the U.S. must guard against when 
working with external agencies. 
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As a supporting effort, the United Sates should also attempt to work 
directly with women and women’s organizations in the Muslim world.  This 
relationship could be built on the mutual understanding of the threat that 
Islamism poses.  This shared understanding is the basis of cooperation.  The 
United States’ engagement with women should occur at the international, 
regional, national, and local levels, ensuring that policies and messages are 
synchronized across every level to prevent misunderstandings or contradictions.  
This maximizes the impact and ensures that the message is delivered to a larger 
audience in a consistent manner.  By working through each of these levels, the 
U.S. also takes advantage of the mutual assistance that these groups lend to 
each other — from international organizations down to the local women’s group.   
The Department of State and USAID are currently running numerous 
programs designed to assist women in the Muslim world and elsewhere.  Some 
of the larger aid programs that contain specific elements for women include 
humanitarian assistance, health, and education.  Other smaller programs include 
opportunities for women in agriculture and other rural environments as well as 
other income-producing skills that are culturally appropriate.  Afghanistan, for 
example, received the third highest amount of U.S. foreign aid in 2006, and both 
USAID and the DOS are running numerous programs, many of which are 
specifically designed to assist women.191  But the State Department and USAID 
are limited in their ability to work with other organizations that are hostile to the 
U.S., or are at least hesitant due to poor perceptions of the U.S..  USAID and the 
DOS are equally limited in their ability to work in countries that are hostile to the 
U.S., such as Iran.  This leaves indirect engagement as the primary method of 
assisting the women’s movement that is already challenging the Islamists in a 
battle for women’s rights and place in the Muslim world. 
One of the United States most powerful weapons to use for direct 
engagement is through diplomatic pressure.  The U.S. can apply diplomatic 
                                            
191 Rhoda Margesson, “U.S. Assistance to Women in Afghanistan and Iraq: Challenges and 
Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Library of Congress (5 January  2006) 5. 
 81
pressure, both negatively and positively, to other nations.  Some strategies 
include limiting agreements, such as trade agreements, with nations that have 
poor women’s rights or on the positive side, entering into treaties or agreements 
that espouse a more favorable policy towards women.  For this to have a greater 
effect, the U.S. should also use its access with the international media to 
influence the Muslim world.  A public information campaign that encourages fair 
treatment of women in Muslim countries and informs the public of this advantage 
can gradually improve the perception of women in those countries.   
An information campaign should consist of exposing Islamist policies and 
actions to a larger audience; this includes translating them and disseminating 
them to as large a media audience as possible, using print, radio, television, and 
online sources to maximize the distribution.  Additionally, referring these issues 
to people who are experts on the issue or hold positions of influence can help to 
illicit culturally appropriate interpretations.  Opening the expert’s comments or 
declarations up for debate can also help to broaden the impact and the 
understanding of the issue.  Working to keep relevant stories and issues, as they 
relate to Islamist policies and women, in the greater public sphere as well as in 
the country or region of interest will work to apply constant scrutiny to the 
Islamists.  The world, and especially the Muslim world, viewing their actions 
through a microscope would increase pressure on the Islamists to reform their 
policies and behavior.  This is especially true when Islamic scholars conduct this 
debate.  This is a means of amplifying the moderate voices inside Islam.  An 
information campaign could help to apply pressure directly to the country in 
question or, indirectly, by informing its otherwise uninformed populace.  
Women and women’s organizations are powerful allies for the United 
States in the war of ideas against Islamism.  They are allies who have been 
directly challenging the Islamists, and have won some battles, but the issue is far 
from resolved.  These women and women’s groups are promoting a competing 
view of Islam from within the Islamist’s own strongholds and have made progress 
in regaining some of their rights and their place in their societies.  The United 
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States is in a position to help both indirectly and directly with the careful 
application of soft power to assist these women in challenging the broken 
promises of the Islamists.   
This thesis demonstrated that women and women’s groups in the Muslim 
world could be strong allies in reducing the influence and spread of Islamist 
ideologies.  Women and women’s organizations have proven that they are 
effective in resisting the impact of Islamism and have been able to roll back some 
of its repressive policies.  Women and women’s organizations or feminist groups 
are active in the Muslim world already and are a growing voice in the region.  
Therefore, it is of vital interest to the United States government to engage these 
groups and women’s interests as a means of challenging the spread of Islamist 
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